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 “The sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship is being destroyed by 
federal bureaucrats, who have turned the drug war into a war on pain relief.  
Americans suffering from chronic pain and their doctors are the real victims 
of this unprincipled and medically unsound federal campaign.” 
 
Rep. Ron Paul, M.D.1  
 
“‘[P]hysicians are particularly easily deterred by the threat of 
governmental investigation and/or sanction from engaging in conduct that is 
entirely lawful and medically appropriate. . . .  [A] physician’s practice is 
particularly dependent upon the physician’s maintaining a reputation of 
unimpeachable integrity.  A physician’s career can be effectively destroyed 
merely by the fact that a governmental body has investigated his or her 
practice.’” 
Judge Alex Kozinski2 
 
“[T]hese aggressive and ill-informed prosecutions convey a message of 
intimidation to doctors and of indifference to the plight of patients in pain . . . 
not even the most honest and competent doctors can practice pain medicine 
with any assurance of safety for themselves or continuity of care for their 
patients.” 
 
Dr. William Hurwitz3 
 
 1. The Federal War on Pain Relief, RON PAUL’S TEXAS STRAIGHT TALK: A WEEKLY COLUMN 
(Ron Paul, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 19, 2004, at www.house.gov/paul/tst/tst2004/tst041904.htm 
(last visited July 23, 2008). 
 2. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 640 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) 
(quoting expert witness Alice Pasetta Mead’s report) (alterations in original). 
 3. Letter from Dr. William Hurwitz to Patients and Colleagues (Aug. 31, 2002) (on file 
with author) (describing his reasons for closing his pain practice since his arrest and 
prosecution for the prescription of opioids allegedly resulting in two patient deaths). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the course of the last decade, federal and state prosecutors have 
arrested and charged several hundred physicians with criminal violations 
related to their prescribing of opioid analgesics.4  In many cases, the 
physicians pled guilty or were appropriately convicted.  In a number of 
troubling cases, however, the physicians arguably were wrongly charged.5  
While some of these providers ultimately were exonerated through acquittal 
or appeal, their careers, and in many cases their personal lives, were 
destroyed.6  Moreover, a number of physicians have been convicted and are 
serving time (or served time) in prison, but the question of their 
“wrongdoing” continues to be debated.7 
 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 20-32. 
 5. In some of these cases, the original charges were subsequently dropped.  See, e.g., 
Doctor Ordered to Forfeit Funds, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL, June 1, 2005, at L10 (noting 
that murder charges were dropped in the prosecution of Dr. Jong Bek of Gary, Indiana, “when 
a toxicologist determined he could not link the deaths to medications Bek prescribed”); Jim 
Schultz, Testimony Starts in Fraud Case: Charges Reduced Against Doctor Accused of Trying to 
Bilk Medi-Cal, REDDING REC. SEARCHLIGHT, May 13, 2004, at B1 (describing the case of Dr. 
Frank Fisher of Redding, California, who was prosecuted for eight misdemeanor counts rather 
than the original suspicion of murder).  In some situations, the physicians were tried and 
acquitted.  See, e.g., Rex Bowman, No Convictions Against Physician; the Jury Acquits on 
Some Charges, Can’t Reach Verdict on Others, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2003, at 
B4 (describing the case of Dr. Cecil Knox, Roanoke, Virginia); Lisa Thompson, Troubles Linger 
for Acquitted Doctor, ERIE TIMES-NEWS, May 30, 2006, at 1 (describing the case of Dr. Paul 
Heberle, an Erie, Pennsylvania, physician who struggled with debt and cocaine addiction 
despite his acquittal).  In other instances, the provider was found guilty at the trial court level, 
but the verdict was later overturned on appeal.  See, e.g., Angie Welling, Psychiatrist Files 
Lawsuit: Weitzel Sues All Involved in His Murder Trials, DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake 
City), Aug. 18, 2004, at B4 (Dr. Robert Weitzel of Layton, Utah, was convicted in 2000 of 
“two counts of second-degree felony manslaughter and three counts of misdemeanor 
negligent homicide. The verdicts were later overturned when a judge ruled prosecutors 
withheld critical evidence.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Worried Pain Doctors Decry Prosecutions, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 29, 2003, at A1 (“In recent years, . . . charges of illegally prescribing prescription 
narcotics, criminal conspiracy, racketeering and even murder have been brought in dozens of 
states against scores of doctors who treat chronic pain with prescription narcotics.  At least two 
have been imprisoned, one committed suicide, several are awaiting sentencing, many are 
preparing for trial, and more have lost their licenses to practice medicine and accumulated 
huge legal bills.”); Sam Stanton, Murder Case Dissolved, but So Did Doctor’s Life, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 23, 2004, at A1 (describing Dr. Frank Fisher’s case); Thompson, supra 
note 5 (describing the case of Dr. Paul Heberle). 
 7. See, e.g., Wayne J. Guglielmo, Why Is This Indiana Doctor Sitting in Jail?, MED. 
ECON., July 21, 2006, at 17 (describing the cases of  brothers and co-defendants Drs. David 
and Charles Chube); Tad Lonergan, A Personal Experience in the Criminal Justice System, 3 
MED. SENTINEL 139, 140 (1998) (discussing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision 
against the prosecutor of Dr. Tad Lonergan who was accused of lying and dishonesty in the 
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The motivation for this increased attention to physician prescribing and 
legal action by prosecutors appears to have roots in the war on drugs and 
the recent spate of deaths related to the abuse of OxyContin, a time 
released opioid analgesic approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) in 1995.8  Around the same time that these drug-related deaths were 
occurring, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) came under criticism 
for its failure to develop measurable performance targets for its drug control 
efforts and was looking for a “new front” for its battle against illegal drugs.9  
As a result, in 2001, the DEA began a new anti-drug campaign targeting 
the prescribing and use of OxyContin.10  The campaign raised the level of 
scrutiny DEA applied to opioid analgesic use to the level applied to non-
prescription street drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and marijuana.11  While 
employing this intense scrutiny was a response to a relatively new drug, 
prosecuting physicians for prescribing narcotics has a long history in this 
country and drug regulators have long attempted to balance negative effects 
(toxicity, addiction, and diversion) with positive effects (therapeutic benefit 
and pain relief).12 
In this Article, I argue that these recent prosecutions are a result of a 
significant imbalance in our drug control laws and policies.  In particular, I 
 
prosecution of the case); Frank Bass, Use of Painkillers Skyrockets, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Sept. 
2, 2007, at G1 (discussing threats received by Dr. Deborah Bordeaux of  “100-year sentence 
if she did not help the prosecution.”); John Tierney, Editorial, Sex, Lies, and OxyContin: A 
Pittsburgh Case Shows What’s Wrong with the DEA’s War Against Doctors, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Jan. 25, 2006, at B7 (stating that the testimony of one of the key witnesses in the 
trial of Dr. Bernard Rottschaefer may have been perjured); see also, e.g., infra Section II 
(discussing the cases of Dr. William Hurwitz and Dr. Ronald McIver); Drew Douglas, Physician 
Receives Nearly 63-Year Prison Sentence for OxyContin Deaths, 11 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 461, 
470 (Mar. 28, 2002) (discussing the trial of Dr. James Graves and stating that “[a]t trial, the 
defense argued that many of the patients who came lied about their symptoms, usually chronic 
lower back pain, in order to receive prescriptions”); Barry Meier, OxyContin Prescribers Face 
Charges in Fatal Overdoses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A14 (describing the indictment of 
Florida physician Denis Deonarine for felony murder in the overdose death of a patient). 
 8. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN ABUSE AND DIVERSION 
EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 8 (2003), available at www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/ 
oxycontin/oxycontinGAOreport.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008). 
 9. Ronald T. Libby, Treating Doctors as Drug Dealers: The DEA’s War on Prescription 
Painkillers, POL’Y ANALYSIS (CATO Inst., Wash., D.C.), June 16, 2005, at 1, 4, available at 
www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa545.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008). 
 10. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS AND CHEMICALS OF 
CONCERN: ACTION PLAN TO PREVENT THE DIVERSION AND ABUSE OF OXYCONTIN, at 
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugs_concern/oxycodone/abuse_oxy.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 
2008); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 8. 
 11. Libby, supra note 9, at 5. 
 12. Joseph Spillane & William B. McAllister, Keeping the Lid On: A Century of Drug 
Regulation and Control, 70 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE S5, S5 (2003). 
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assert that this imbalance stems from the standard in the federal Controlled 
Substances Act, its state counterparts, and implementing regulations used by 
prosecutors to arrest and prosecute physicians for “inappropriate” 
prescribing.  Under the standard, a physician is guilty of criminal conduct if 
he or she prescribes without a “legitimate medical purpose” and outside 
“the usual course of his professional practice.”13  Applying this standard in 
these cases harms not only the physicians who are arguably wrongly 
accused but also the patients of these physicians and other individuals who 
suffer from chronic pain.  Because many physicians fear criminal sanctions 
for prescribing opioids, pain sufferers may not be able to receive adequate 
pain care.  The law enforcement climate surrounding prescribing opioid 
analgesics appears to be causing some physicians to stop prescribing 
opioids or stop treating chronic pain patients, reducing an already very 
small number of physicians willing to treat these needy patients.14  As a 
result, the physicians who continue to see patients with chronic pain also 
make themselves an easy target for law enforcement officials. 
 
 13. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2007). 
 14. See Ronald T. Libby, The DEA’s “One-tenth of One Percent” Myth of Doctors Who 
Are Sanctioned, Address at the CATO Institute Conference: Drug Cops and Doctors–Is the 
DEA Hampering the Treatment of Chronic Pain?, at 2 (Sept. 9, 2005), available at 
www.doctordeluca.com/Library/WOD/CopsDocsCato-Libby05.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) 
(estimating that the number of physicians who specialize in the treatment of chronic pain is 
between 4,278 and 5,869);  see also Marc Kaufman, Specialists Decry DEA Reversal on Pain 
Drugs: New Rules Called a ‘Step Backward,’ WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A8 
(acknowledging the strong concern among pain physicians that the DEA’s recent 
pronouncements will have a chilling effect on physician prescribing, making it more difficult for 
pain patients to receive adequate treatment); Tina Rosenberg, Editorial, Weighing the 
Difference Between Treating Pain and Dealing Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at A12 
(expressing concern that the recent conviction of a physician treating chronic pain will lead to 
fewer doctors who are willing to prescribe strong painkillers for their patients who suffer from 
pain); Sally Satel, Doctors Behind Bars: Treating Pain Is Now Risky Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
19, 2004, at F6 (examining the law enforcement climate surrounding the prescription of pain 
medications); Doug Smith, Lawmen vs. the Drug Warriors: Attorneys General Seek Change in 
DEA Policy, ARK. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at 13 (quoting an advertisement by Common Sense 
for Drug Policy—“a ‘drug reform’ organization”—that quotes a CATO Institute study, supra 
note 9, stating the DEA’s “‘renewed war on pain doctors has frightened many physicians out 
of pain management altogether, exacerbating an already serious health crisis . . . .’”); Jane 
Spencer, Crackdown on Drugs Hits Chronic-Pain Patients: Amid Tighter Regulation of 
Painkillers, Physicians Pull Back on Prescriptions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2004, at D1 (describing 
the federal government’s increasing efforts to end prescription drug abuse and its impact on 
legitimate physicians and their patients who suffer from chronic pain); Letter from Thirty State 
Attorneys General to Karen Tandy, Adm’r, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin. 2 (Jan. 19, 2005), 
available at www.csdp.org/naagletter.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) (asserting that a DEA 
“Interim Policy Statement ‘Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain’ . . . 
seems likely to have a chilling effect on physicians engaged in the legitimate practice of 
medicine”). 
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In Part II of this Article I describe the available data on, and selected 
cases of, recent arrests and prosecutions of physicians for inappropriate 
prescribing of pain medication.  In Parts III and IV, I discuss the “culture 
clash” and historical tension between physicians and drug enforcement 
personnel, and in Part V, I describe the evolution of opioid use for chronic 
pain treatment.  In Parts VI and VII, I summarize the legal basis for the arrest 
and prosecution of physicians in this context along with law enforcement 
efforts.  Finally, in parts VIII and IX, I make a series of arguments based on 
legal, ethical, and policy grounds as to why the current criminal standard is 
inappropriate and suggest an alternative standard that arguably more 
accurately calibrates the balance between the dual goals of pain treatment 
and reduction of drug diversion and abuse. 
II.  ARRESTS AND PROSECUTIONS OF PHYSICIANS FOR OPIOID PRESCRIBING 
The exact number of physicians who have been investigated, arrested, 
and/or prosecuted over the last decade for inappropriately prescribing 
opioids is difficult to determine.  Investigations, arrests, and charges are not 
compiled in a central, publicly available database.  Therefore, estimates 
must be pieced together from reports, news articles, DEA statements, and 
Web sites that track some of these cases.  In 2001, DEA statistics indicate 
that there were 3,097 diversion investigations, 861 of which were 
investigations of doctors.15  In 2003, there were 736 DEA investigations and 
51 arrests of physicians for diversion of controlled substances.16  Focusing 
only on OxyContin, between October 1999 and March 2002, DEA 
reported investigating 247 OxyContin diversion cases, which led to 328 
arrests.17 And, between May 2001 and January 2004, DEA agents arrested 
approximately 600 people for violation of laws related to distribution, 
dispensing, or possession of OxyContin.18  Of those arrested, 60% were 
professionals such as doctors and pharmacists.19  DEA also has its own Web 
site that lists “investigations of physician registrants in which DEA was 
 
 15. Libby, supra note 9, at 15 (citing DEA UPDATE, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AUTHORITIES, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 17-18 (Oct. 2002)). 
 16. The Infinite Mind: The Double Life of OxyContin (Lichtenstein Creative Media 
broadcast Mar. 10, 2004), summary at www.lcmedia.com/mind313.htm (last visited July 23, 
2008). 
 17. Controlled Substances Registration and Reregistration Application Fees, 68 Fed. Reg. 
7728, 7730 (Feb. 18, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1301). 
 18. To Do No Harm: Strategies for Preventing Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on 
Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 40-41 (2004), available at www.access.gpo.gov/congress/ 
house/pdf/108hrg/95555.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) (statement of Thomas W. Raffanello, 
Special Agent in Charge, Miami Division, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration). 
 19. Id. 
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involved that resulted in the arrest and prosecution of the registrant.”20  The 
list, covering arrests from January 2003 through February 2008, includes 
117 physicians, at least 47 of whom were arrested for prescribing pain 
medication outside the scope of professional practice or without a legitimate 
medical purpose.21  This figure is based solely on selected federal arrests 
announced by the DEA.  Therefore, it underestimates the total of such law 
enforcement actions, which also include arrests by state law enforcement 
personnel. 
An effort to compile a list of arrests and prosecutions of physicians for 
illegal distribution of opioids from newspaper accounts and Web sites 
between 1998 and 2005 yielded 205 cases.22  Charges in the cases ranged 
from rape23 to murder,24 felony murder,25 manslaughter,26 drug trafficking,27 
 
 20. Office of Diversion Control, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Cases Against Doctors: 
Criminal Cases, at www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/crim_admin_actions/crim_actions.htm (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2008). 
 21. Id.  Of the 47 physicians, 32 pled guilty, 13 were convicted by a jury, 2 are awaiting 
trial, and one has a pending adjudication.  Id.   
 22. See David Brushwood, Criminal Prosecutions of Physicians for Offenses Related to the 
Prescribing of Scheduled Opioid Analgesics 1998-2003 (on file with the author) (listing 
criminal prosecutions of sixty-eight physicians in Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, 
Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia). Other similar lists are 
available.  See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc., Pain Management - Physician 
Prosecutions and Board Actions, at www.aapsonline.org/painman/pm-ppba.htm (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2008) (lists physicians arrested for illegal prescribing of opioids); Our Chronic Pain 
Mission, Pain Politics, at www.cpmission.com/politics/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (listing 
physicians prosecuted by the DEA); Pain Relief Network, Information and Research: Clinical 
Litigation, at www.painreliefnetwork.org/clinical-litigation/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (listing 
information about the cases of eight physicians). 
 23. See, e.g., Duane Bourne, Charges Against Doctor Dismissed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
May 31, 2003, at 1 (stating that prosecutors dropped charges against Dr. A. Hussam 
Armashi, a Florida doctor accused of raping a patient to whom he had prescribed high-dose 
pain medications). 
 24. See, e.g., Todd Dvorak, Court Upholds Ex-Doctor’s Homicide Conviction, SOUTH 
BEND TRIB., July 27, 2000, at D1 (discussing South Bend, Indiana, doctor Ernest Stiller’s 
conviction for killing a woman who died from the combined effects of three drugs, two of 
which were prescribed and one of which was “a painkiller”); Becky Purser, Perry Doctor Turns 
Self In, MACON TELEGRAPH, July 27, 2004, at A1 (describing Dr. Spurgeon Green, Perry, 
Georgia, indicted for the murder of six patients due to overdose from prescribed drugs); Scott 
Sandlin, Prescribing Doctor Gets Probation, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov. 23, 2004, at A1 
(discussing the probation order of Dr. Jesse Benjamin Henry, Jr., Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
who was accused, along with his wife of murdering seven patients for whom methadone and 
other opioid analgesics were prescribed); Ralph Vartabedian, Jury Finds Doctor Not Guilty: 
The Operator of a Shasta County Clinic Was Accused of Improperly Prescribing Painkillers and 
of Medi-Cal Fraud in a Long-Running Case, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at B6 (discussing the 
not guilty verdict of Dr. Frank Fisher, Redding, California, accused of prescribing high doses 
of opioids to patients who died). 
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illegal drug distribution,28 illegal delivery of a controlled substance,29 and 
unlawful prescribing.30  In February 2002, Dr. James Graves became the 
first physician to be criminally convicted of OxyContin related deaths.31  He 
was sentenced to 62.9 years in prison.32  
 While many of these arrests and prosecutions were appropriate, a 
number were not.  The following represent some of the most troubling 
 
 25. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 7 (describing the indictment of Florida physician Denis 
Deonarine, for felony murder in the overdose death of a patient); Sharlonda L. Waterhouse, 
Gary Doctor Held on Murder, Charges of Dealing Drugs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 24, 2002, at 
16 (describing the case of Dr. Jong H. Bek, who was charged with felony murder  based on 
prescriptions he gave to “two men [who] were killed by a cocktail of legal and illegal drugs, 
some of which were obtained through Bek”). 
 26. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 7 (describing the case of Dr. James Graves, of Pace, 
Florida, who was accused of causing the overdose deaths of four patients for whom he had 
prescribed OxyContin and other drugs); John Pacenti & Antigone Barton, Psychiatrist Gets 
Year for Patient’s Pill Death, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 1C (describing the case of Dr. 
George Kubski, a West Palm Beach, Florida physician who prescribed 20,000 pills in the 
three months prior to a patient’s death and was sentenced to jail for “manslaughter by 
culpable negligence”); Sarah Prohaska, Doctor Convicted of 1 Death, Trafficking: Acquitted in 
Gardens Man’s Death, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 7, 2006, at 1A (describing the case of Dr. 
Asuncion Luyao, a Port St. Lucie, Florida physician, who had six patients die from alleged 
OxyContin overdoses). 
 27. See, e.g., Alex Kuczynski, Is It Botox, or Is It Bogus?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, § 9, at 
1 (describing the case of Dr. Bach McComb, of Sarasota, Florida, who was accused of 
trafficking addictive pain medications such as oxycodone); Sandlin, supra note 24 (describing 
the case of Dr. Jesse Benjamin Henry, Jr.); Jay Ditzer, Drug-Abusing Doctors, WHAS11 NEWS 
(Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 23, 2004, at www.whas11.com/topstories/stories/WHAS11_TOP_Drug 
Doctors.81a2e2a0.html (last visited July 23, 2008) (stating that Dr. Brent Ryabik, a psychiatrist 
from Kentucky, was “accused of trafficking prescription drugs”). 
 28. See, e.g., Anne T. Denogean, Doctor Faces 108 Charges: Jeri B. Hassman Allegedly 
Overprescribed Pain Medication and Is Accused of Health-Care Fraud, TUCSON CITIZEN, Apr. 
1, 2003, at 1D (describing charges against a Tucson, Arizona physician, including over 100 
counts of prescribing morphine, methadone, Vicodin, and OxyContin “without a legitimate 
medical reason”); see also News Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Va., July 26, 
2001, at www.oig.dol.gov/public/media/vmody.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (announcing 
a 140-count indictment against Oakwood, Virginia doctor Kailas Modi and her husband Dr. 
Vinod Modi, including “63 counts of unlawfully dispensing prescription drugs”). 
 29. See, e.g., Kelly Wolfe, Patients Stand by Their Beset Physician, PALM BEACH POST, Nov. 
10, 2003, at 1A (discussing the arrest of Dr. Darshan Shah, a Vero Beach, Florida doctor who 
allegedly pre-signed blank prescriptions for a nurse practitioner who was doing the actual 
prescribing of “powerful painkillers”). 
 30. See, e.g., Korie Wilkins, Two Doctors Accused of Issuing Fake Prescriptions, DAILY 
OAKLAND PRESS, Apr. 19, 2005, at A1(explaining the case of Dr. Subadra Deandra and Dr. 
Dewundara Dayananda, of Waterford Township, Michigan, who allegedly sold prescriptions 
for painkillers for $100). 
 31. Douglas, supra note 7, at 469. 
 32. Id. 
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arrests and prosecutions of physicians related to their prescribing of opioids 
and demonstrate the difficulty of applying the prevailing criminal law 
standard set forth in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to these kinds of 
cases.  While they are only a fraction of the cases brought against 
physicians, they illustrate several themes of the larger body of arrests and 
prosecutions.  For example, in many of the cases, (1) the physicians treated 
a large number of chronic pain patients and prescribed large volumes of 
opioids; (2) there was no evidence that the physicians benefited financially 
from their prescribing (other than for the office visit); (3) experts disputed the 
“reasonableness” of the physician’s prescribing practices; and (4) the 
physician’s patients often included drug addicts who lied to the physician to 
obtain their drugs. 
A. Dr. Frank Fisher 
Dr. Frank Fisher operated a clinic near Redding, California, from 1995 
until February 1999, when he was arrested for prescribing large dosages of 
opioids that allegedly were related to several deaths.33  At the time of his 
arrest, his practice consisted of about 3,000 patients.34  Fisher graduated 
from Harvard Medical School and practiced general medicine for over 
twenty years, primarily in underserved communities, including healthcare 
facilities on Native American reservations.35  He opened the clinic near 
Redding “to serve the general practice and urgent care needs of the 
MediCal population of Shasta County[,]” California.36  Approximately 5%–
10% of his patients suffered from severe, chronic intractable pain and he 
prescribed opioids for many of them.37 
On February 18, 1999, over twenty armed law enforcement agents 
stormed into Fisher’s clinic and arrested him.38  The California Attorney 
General charged Dr. Fisher with prescribing excessive amounts of controlled 
substances and three counts of first degree murder stemming from those 
prescriptions.39  Later, two additional murder charges were added.40  
 
 33. Stanton, supra note 6; Pain Doctor and Pharmacist Arrested for Mass Murder, at 
What Was Dr. Fisher’s Clinic Doing? (undated, un-paginated pamphlet from Dr. Fisher’s 
clinic, on file with author) [hereinafter Fisher Fact Sheet]. 
 34. Stanton, supra note 6. 
 35. Fisher Fact Sheet, supra note 33, at Who is Dr. Fisher?. 
 36. Id. at What Was Dr. Fisher’s Clinic Doing?. 
 37. Stanton, supra note 6. 
 38. David B. Brushwood, Commentary, Professional Casualties in America’s War on 
Drugs, 60 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 2004, 2004 (2003); Fisher Fact Sheet, supra note 
33, at What Was the Arrest Like?. 
 39. Lynda Gledhill & Suzanne Espinosa Solis, Doctor, 2 Pharmacists Held in Shasta Drug 
Sting: Investigators Link Ring to 3 Fatal Overdoses, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 1999, at A1 (noting 
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Because Fisher could not make his $15 million bail, he spent five months in 
jail during his preliminary hearing.41  At the close of the hearing, in July 
1999, the judge dismissed two of the murder charges and reduced the three 
remaining murder charges to involuntary manslaughter.42  Apparently, the 
evidence showing the deaths with which Fisher was charged resulted from 
his patients taking the medications that he prescribed was inadequate.43  
For example, one of the patients for whom he prescribed opioids died as a 
passenger in an automobile accident.44  Another death occurred when a 
non-patient stole and overdosed on medications that Fisher had prescribed 
to a patient.45  While Dr. Fisher was in jail, a patient, with a documented 
history of pain and need for opioids, became despondent because she was 
unable to obtain her pain medications and died.46  Fisher was “released on 
[his] own recognizance, subject to the condition that [he] not practice 
medicine . . . until the matter was resolved.”47 
The prosecution’s case against Fisher was largely based on the volume 
of opioids he prescribed—Fisher was the largest prescriber of OxyContin in 
the state.48  Yet, an expert witness for the prosecution testified that the opioid 
dosages that Dr. Fisher prescribed were not unreasonable and that he, the 
expert, frequently prescribed higher dosages for his patients.49  In his 
defense, Fisher asserted that he adhered to accepted standards of care and 
practices for treatment of pain patients including: 
 [r]igorous pre-treatment screening to exclude potential abusers of pain 
medications. . . . ; 
 
the twenty-seven count indictment against Fisher on murder and fraud charges); see also 
Brushwood, supra note 38 (discussing the charges in the Fisher case). 
 40. Brushwood, supra note 38; Carl T. Hall, Jury Acquits Doctor in Pain-Control Test 
Case, S.F. CHRON., May 20, 2004, at A1. 
 41. Brushwood, supra note 38, at 2004-05; Fisher Fact Sheet, supra note 33, at What 
Was the Arrest Like?. 
 42. Gary Delsohn, Doctor’s Murder Charges Dropped: Shasta Judge Substitutes 
Involuntary Manslaughter Counts, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 16, 1999, at A1. (“The involuntary 
manslaughter charges were allowed to stand . . . because Fisher . . . should have understood 
the risk involved in prescribing . . . high amounts of addictive painkillers.”). 
 43. See id. 
 44. Fisher Fact Sheet, supra note 33, at Were Murder Charges Appropriate?. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Brushwood, supra note 38, at 2005. 
 48. See Stanton, supra note 6 (“The huge amount of painkilling medicine Fisher was 
prescribing is what led to the case in the first place.  Medi-Cal officials noted there had been 
an enormous jump in such prescriptions in 1998, with Fisher dispensing more of the medicine 
than any of the other 50,000 OxyContin prescribers in the state.”). 
 49. Brushwood, supra note 38, at 2005. 
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 [m]andatory mental health evaluations of all [c]hronic [p]ain patients by 
a licensed professional; 
 [e]jection of patients caught lying, diverting medications or ingesting 
non-therapeutic doses. . . . ; 
 [r]egular and frequent blood and urine testing for medication serum 
levels, as well as for illegal substances; 
 [m]andatory signature of a Controlled Substances Agreement by each 
[c]hronic [p]ain patient containing: 1) an informed consent, 2) an 
agreement not to divert medications, and 3) an agreement to report any 
misuse or diversion of medications.50 
Following these practices, Fisher terminated more than 400 patients from 
his clinic.51  
 Three years after his arrest, the manslaughter and drug diversion 
charges against Fisher were dropped, and, approximately one and a half 
years later, Fisher was acquitted of further charges of defrauding the Medi-
Cal system.52  Fisher claims the alleged fraud amounted to approximately 
$150 in overbilling.53  Although Fisher was exonerated of all criminal 
charges, he faced potential disciplinary action by the state medical board 
and civil suits brought by the relatives of patients of his who died allegedly 
as a result of his negligent prescribing of opioids.54  In February 2005, the 
last of four wrongful death suits against him was dismissed.55  The court 
ordered two of the four plaintiffs to pay Fisher damages.56 
Although the judge presiding over the criminal case had forbidden 
Fisher to practice medicine while he was out on bail, the state never 
suspended his license.57  However, on August 10, 2005, the Board 
 
 50. Fisher Fact Sheet, supra note 33, at Did Dr. Fisher Practice Good Medicine?. 
 51. Radley Balko, Another Victim of the Drug War, FREEMAN, Apr. 2005, at 12, 13, 
available at www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/issue.asp?fid=276 (last visited July 23, 
2008); see also Stanton, supra note 6 (“Fisher estimate[d] that state undercover agents visited 
him at least seven times trying to obtain prescriptions using bogus ailments, and that he 
refused to provide them with medicine.”). 
 52. Maline Hazle, Fisher’s Ordeal Finally Is Over: Last of Four Death Suits Dismissed, 
REDDING REC. SEARCHLIGHT, Feb. 2, 2005, at A1; Not With a Bang but a Whimper: California 
Pain Doctor Frank Fisher Exonerated in Last Criminal Case, DRUG WAR CHRON. (Drug Reform 
Coordination Network, Wash., D.C.), May 21, 2004, at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle-
old/338/frank.shtml (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) [hereinafter DRUG WAR CHRON.]. 
 53. Hall, supra note 40. 
 54. Id.; see also DRUG WAR CHRON., supra note 52 (“[T]he attorney general is now going 
to prosecute me yet again on the same charges, this time before the state medical board.  
They will try to go after my license in an administrative venue . . . .” (quoting Dr. Fisher)). 
 55. See Hazle, supra note 52. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
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sentenced him to three years of probation under the condition that he would 
take a refresher course in general medicine, keep a list of any controlled 
substances that he prescribes, and have his cases monitored.58 
B. Dr. Cecil Knox 
In 1992, after serving as medical director of the rehabilitation unit at 
Lewis Gale Hospital in Roanoke, Virginia, Dr. Cecil Knox opened his own 
outpatient clinic, Southwest Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation.59  His 
practice focused on pain management and physical rehabilitation.60 
 On February 1, 2002, more than a dozen federal agents burst into 
Knox’s office with guns drawn while he was seeing patients and arrested 
him.61  He was taken away in handcuffs and leg irons and was indicted on 
numerous charges that he allegedly prescribed narcotics outside the scope 
of legitimate medical practice, which led to several overdose deaths.62  His 
office manager was indicted on the same charges.63  In October 2002, a 
federal grand jury indicted Knox on fifty drug-related charges and nineteen 
fraud, racketeering, and conspiracy charges related to his billing practices.64  
According to news accounts of the trial, prosecutors alleged that Knox ran a 
“pill mill” from his office where he handed out “prescriptions for powerful 
drugs like OxyContin and methadone to known addicts and others who 
came to see him with stories of severe pain.”65  They alleged that his 
“eagerness to prescribe potent drugs contributed to the deaths of seven 
patients”66 and that he was the nineteenth leading prescriber of OxyContin 
 
 58. In re Fisher, No. 02-1999-95522, at 3-8 (Div. of Med. Quality, Med. Board of Ca. 
July 11, 2005) (Stipulated Settlement and Disciplinary Order), available at 
http://publicdocs.medbd.ca.gov/pdl/mbc.aspx (enter Frank Fisher’s name in search boxes); 
see also Hazle, supra note 52. 
 59. Jen McCaffery, Knox Takes Stand and Testifies in His Own Defense: Oxycontin ‘Was a 
Real Godsend for Chronic Pain Management,’ Doctor Says, ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 16, 2003, 
at A1 [hereinafter McCaffery, Knox Takes Stand and Testifies in His Own Defense]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Maia Szalavitz, Dr. Feelscared: Drug Warriors Put the Fear of Prosecution in Physicians 
Who Dare to Treat Pain, REASON, Aug. 2004, at 32. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Jen McCaffery, Drug Users’ Injuries Could Lengthen Sentences: 2 Heroin Conspiracy 
Cases Involve 2 Deaths and 6 Other Overdoses, Prosecutor Says, ROANOKE TIMES, July 28, 
2002, at B1 [hereinafter McCaffery, Drug Users’ Injuries Could Lengthen Sentences]. Two of 
Knox’s employees were charged initially, but only his office manager was indicted. Id. 
 64. Bowman, supra note 5. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id.  Other news accounts report as many as ten deaths.  See, e.g., McCaffery, Drug 
Users’ Injuries Could Lengthen Sentences, supra note 63 (describing charges that Knox 
“overprescribed drugs that either killed or seriously injured 10 of his patients.  Federal 
prosecutors will not confirm how many deaths versus serious injuries, they argue, have 
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in the country.67  They also brought forth witnesses who illustrated the risks 
of treating patients with chronic pain.  Several former patients testified that 
they lied to Dr. Knox about their pain in order to obtain a prescription for a 
narcotic.68  One patient told Knox “he was in pain and always seemed to 
run out of his OxyContin weeks early.”69  Another patient “injected 
OxyContin in the sole of his foot so no track marks would be visible in a 
typical medical exam.”70 
 Knox argued that several of the overdose deaths occurred over a year 
and a half after he had stopped prescribing medications for these patients.71  
To the extent he prescribed for individuals with a drug addiction, he said 
that he did so to treat their pain.72  For example, Knox treated Edgar 
O’Brien, a recovering heroin addict, for knee and back pain.73  O’Brien, 
like many others whom Knox treated, “presented him with difficult 
choices.”74  During Knox’s testimony, he stated that “he regularly had to 
make decisions about the consequences of treating people [with histories of 
psychiatric problems or substance abuse] instead of turning them away.”75  
He was concerned that if he did not treat O’Brien, he would obtain his 
drugs illegally on the street.76  However, after Knox discovered that O’Brien 
was abusing the painkillers he had prescribed, he stopped prescribing 
medication for O’Brien and never saw him again.77   O’Brien  died  from an  
 
resulted”); Jen McCaffery, Knox Defends Care of Patients: Cross-Examination Expected Today, 
ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 17, 2003, at B1 (describing Knox’s testimony defending himself and 
listing “eight patients who fatally overdosed”) [hereinafter McCaffery, Knox Defends Care of 
Patients]. 
 67. Bowman, supra note 5 (stating that “in one year alone, Knox wrote prescriptions for 
$1.6 million worth of OxyContin”); see also McCaffery, Knox Takes Stand and Testifies in His 
Own Defense, supra note 59 (describing how prosecutors made unrelated allegations to paint 
an unflattering picture of Knox, including witness testimony that Knox smoked marijuana with 
patients and an employee on more than one occasion). 
 68. See, e.g., Jen McCaffery, Ex-Patients of Dr. Knox Testify They Lied to Him: All 3 Have 
Been Convicted of Crimes that Stem from Abuse of Prescription Drugs, ROANOKE TIMES, Sept. 
25, 2003, at B1 (describing several of Dr. Knox’s patients who did not become patients 
through traditional referrals and lied about their backgrounds in order “to get in good with 
him”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Jen McCaffery, Woman in Knox Trial Cleared of All Charges: Judge Clears 
Kathleen O’Gee, ROANOKE TIMES, Oct. 9, 2003, at A1. 
 72. See McCaffery, Knox Defends Care of Patients, supra note 66. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. McCaffery, Knox Defends Care of Patients, supra note 66. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
244 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:231 
overdose approximately nineteen months after Knox last prescribed any 
medication for him.78 
 After eight weeks of testimony, one of the longest trials in recent history 
in western Virginia,79 a U.S. District Court jury found Knox not guilty of thirty 
of the sixty-nine charges against him.80  The jurors were unable to reach a 
verdict on the remaining counts and the presiding judge declared a 
mistrial.81  One juror commented that the decision not to convict was based 
on the prosecution’s failure to show that Knox had the knowledge or intent 
to commit the crimes of which he was accused.82  According to the juror, the 
evidence indicated that Knox had made some mistakes and may have been 
careless but was not sufficient to show that Knox’s prescribing constituted 
criminal behavior.83 
 Despite the jury’s decision, federal prosecutors continued to pursue Knox 
aggressively and three months after his first trial ended, Knox was indicted 
again, facing ninety-five charges, “including racketeering, conspiracy to 
commit racketeering, criminal conspiracy, mail fraud and perjury.”84  These 
new allegations included fourteen charges that Knox’s opioid prescriptions 
were outside the scope of legitimate medical practice and led to death or 
serious bodily injury.85  Shortly before the second trial, Knox entered into a 
plea bargain with federal prosecutors.86  According to an op-ed piece 
written by his wife, he agreed to the plea bargain for a number of reasons.87  
In addition to having borrowed over $1 million and needing another half-
million to continue defending himself, Knox was diagnosed with non-
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Jen McCaffery, Jury Finds Pain Specialist Not Guilty on Many Charges, ROANOKE 
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter McCaffery, Jury Finds Pain Specialist Not Guilty on 
Many Charges]. 
 80. Bowman, supra note 5; see also McCaffery, Jury Finds Pain Specialist Not Guilty on 
Many Charges, supra note 79 (listing the Knox verdicts). 
 81. Bowman, supra note 5. 
 82. McCaffery, Jury Finds Pain Specialist Not Guilty on Many Charges, supra note 79. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Lindsey Nair, Dr. Knox Pleads Guilty, Surrenders License, ROANOKE TIMES, Sept. 3, 
2005, at A1 (“The racketeering charge relate[d] to two incidents . . . when Knox distributed 
the controlled substance Fastin [a diet pill] to a patient with the understanding that she would 
share the drug with him.  Those acts constitute racketeering because they represent a pattern 
of illegal activity committed within the operation of an enterprise, the medical practice.”) 
[hereinafter Nair, Dr. Knox Pleads Guilty, Surrenders License]. 
 85. Jen McCaffery, Grand Jury Hands Down Charges Against Dr. Knox, ROANOKE TIMES, 
June 18, 2004, at B8. 
 86. Donna Knox, Editorial, Self-Absorbed Prosecutor Goes Too Far, ROANOKE TIMES, Jan. 
26, 2006, at B9. 
 87. Id.  Donna Knox is a former journalist, an advocate for missing American servicemen, 
and a family law practitioner in Roanoke, Virginia.  See id. 
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Hodgkin’s lymphoma during the criminal proceedings.88  Although his 
cancer was in remission, Knox was concerned that the stress of another trial 
might provoke a relapse.89  Finally, he wanted the ordeal to end for his 
office manager, whom the federal prosecutor “had tormented for refusing to 
capitulate.”90 
Knox reluctantly entered into a plea agreement but admitted to only 
minor misconduct unrelated to treating pain patients.91  He was sentenced 
to five years of probation and voluntarily surrendered his state medical 
license and his DEA registration number.92  After the plea bargain, Knox 
worked as a cobbler in a shoe store in Roanoke, Virginia.93 
C. Dr. William Hurwitz 
In September 2003, Dr. William Hurwitz was arrested on a forty-nine 
count federal indictment charging him with “drug trafficking resulting in 
death and serious injury, engaging in a criminal enterprise, conspiracy and 
health care fraud.”94  He was visiting his children on the eve of Rosh 
Hashanah when federal agents took him away in handcuffs.95  The 
indictment was a result of a “wide-ranging federal investigation into doctors, 
pharmacists and patients suspected of selling potent and addictive 
painkillers on a lucrative black market.”96  More than forty people were 
convicted in the comprehensive probe.97  According to a news account of 
the arrest, “[t]he indictment signal[ed] an aggressive push by federal 
prosecutors to hold doctors accountable for what happens to the drugs they 
prescribe” and “highlight[ed] the complexities of proving criminal culpability 
in cases of licensed and reputable physicians prescribing a legal 
painkiller.”98  Hurwitz, like Knox, was one of the first physicians to be 
charged with conspiracy related to his prescribing of opioids.99  According 
to the grand jury, “Hurwitz prescribed ‘countless prescriptions for excessive 
doses’ of controlled drugs with the goal of hooking his patients, getting 
 
 88. Id.; Nair, Dr. Knox Pleads Guilty, Surrenders License, supra note 84. 
 89. Knox, supra note 86. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Lindsey Nair, Pain Doctor Loses License, but Gets No Jail Time, ROANOKE TIMES, Jan. 
21, 2006, at A1. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Josh White, N.Va. Doctor Indicted in OxyContin Scheme, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 
2003, at B6. 
 95. Szalavitz, supra note 61. 
 96. White, supra note 94. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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them to pay him a monthly fee and encouraging illegal sales.”100  Of the 
forty-nine charges, the most serious were that in two cases the conspiracy 
caused fatal overdoses.101  Furthermore, “[t]he indictment allege[d] that 
Hurwitz prescribed medications in as many as [thirty-nine] states, issuing the 
prescriptions with little or no physical examination and sometimes over the 
phone, fax, or the Internet.”102 
Hurwitz received his medical degree from Stanford University in 1971 
and law degree from George Mason University School of Law in 1996.103  
Prior to his criminal arrest, Hurwitz was prosecuted by the Virginia Board of 
Medicine and, in August 1996, had his license to practice in Virginia 
revoked based on excessive prescribing and inadequate supervision of his 
patients.104  The Board initiated its action after two of his patients died in 
January 1996.105  Hurwitz argued that one of the patients committed suicide 
by taking multiple times the recommended dose of a drug that he prescribed 
and that the other died as a result of gastric bleeding, not an overdose.106  
The Board took action despite the fact that “expert testimony had essentially 
disproven the state’s allegation that Hurwitz was at fault.”107  Based on the 
evidence, the Board dropped its initial allegations against Hurwitz, 
recognizing that individuals with chronic pain often require high dosages of 
narcotics, but pursued action against him based on “prescribing without 
adequate medical records.”108  The Board argued that Hurwitz prescribed 
hundreds and thousands of doses to patients without appropriately 
monitoring their progress or status.109  Hurwitz stated that “most of his pain 
patients came to him with well-established problems” and that his main 
purpose in doing a physical exam was to ensure that the patient’s complaint 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. White, supra note 94. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Common Sense for Drug Policy/Partnership for Responsible Drug Information, 
CSDP/PRDI Experts Directory: William E. Hurwitz, at www.csdp.org/csdpcgi/experts.pl?i=84 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2008). 
 104. Jacob Sullum, No Relief in Sight, REASON, Jan. 1997, at 22, 23, 27 (“[T]he Virginia 
Board of Medicine had suspended Hurwitz’s license, charging him with excessive prescribing 
and inadequate supervision of his patients.”). 
 105. Id. at 27. 
 106. Id. at 28. 
 107. War on Pain Control: State and DEA Tell Pain Patients to “Drop Dead,” ACTIVIST 
GUIDE (Drug Reform Coordination Network, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 20, 1996, at 
www.drcnet.org/guide10-96/pain.html (last visited July 23, 2008)[hereinafter Drug Reform 
Coordination Network]. 
 108. Wayne J. Guglielmo, Treating Pain: Can Doctors Put Their Fears to Rest?, MED. 
ECON., Feb. 21, 2000, at 46, 54. 
 109. See Sullum, supra note 104, at 28. 
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was well founded.110  He saw patients who lived in the area once a month 
but saw those who lived out of state only once or twice a year.111  He 
supplemented out-of-state patients’ visits with “a monthly written report and 
telephone calls.”112 
Hurwitz’s license was suspended for three months and then restored on 
a probationary basis.113  He also lost his DEA privileges to prescribe 
narcotics for a year.114  Dr. Hurwitz appealed the Virginia Board’s decision, 
arguing, in part, that the safe harbor provisions of the state’s Intractable 
Pain Act limit the Board’s authority to take action against a medical doctor 
based on the dosages of pain medicine prescribed.115  The Virginia Circuit 
Court, however, affirmed the Board’s decision, finding that it acted in 
accordance with the law, did not make a procedural error resulting in harm, 
and had sufficient evidentiary support for its findings of facts.116 
During the disciplinary proceedings, a number of pain experts supported 
Hurwitz’s practices.  Dr. James Campbell, professor of neurosurgery and 
director of the Blaustein Pain Treatment Center at Johns Hopkins University 
in Baltimore, stated that at Hopkins, they have a national practice: 
We have great difficulty finding physicians . . . that will take over 
medications that work in these patients and take over their programs. 
I think (Dr. Hurwitz) is doing heroic things for his patients.  I think what he is 
doing involves an enormous sacrifice.  There are a lot of bad doctors but he 
is not one of them. 
If we suspend the license of all doctors . . . because one patient committed 
suicide, the pain field would be out of business.117 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Arthur Allen, First Do No Harm, WASH. POST, July 27, 1997 (Magazine), at W11, 
W12. 
 114. Id. Approximately forty-eight of Hurwitz’s patients testified at the hearing on 
revocation of his Virginia license, including some from other parts of the country.  Two 
hundred twenty of his patients filed a class action suit against the Board seeking the return of 
Hurwitz’s privileges, “arguing that his inability to prescribe . . . limited their access to drugs 
they need to live and violated their rights under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act.” Id.  
The suit was dismissed in an unpublished decision in 1996.  See Cooper v. Hasty, No. 97-
1002, 1997 WL 472160, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 1997). 
 115. See Hurwitz v. Bd. of Med., 46 Va. Cir. 119 (1998). 
 116. Id.  Based on the Virginia proceedings, the District of Columbia medical board 
subsequently suspended Hurwitz’s D.C. license by reciprocal action but later reinstated it.  See 
Allen, supra note 113, at W29. 
 117. Deborah Kelly, Ethics Questions Surround Doctor’s Case: Opinions Clash About 
Hurwitz’s Narcotic Treatments, Role in Deaths, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 8, 1996, at 
E1 (alterations in original). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
248 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:231 
Dr. Mitchell Max, director of the Pain Research Clinic at the National 
Institutes of Health, also defended Hurwitz, stating: 
I see nothing wrong with the doses, the amount, the number of pills, per 
se. . . . He is just taking regimens that work in cancer patients that everyone 
agrees on, and using them in people who had life-impairing, or even life-
threatening, levels of pain. . . . We routinely give doses up to 10 times that 
size in patients with cancer.118 
In the summer of 1998, after his license was reinstated and before his 
arrest, Hurwitz was able to prescribe controlled substances and began to 
treat pain again.119  The Web site describing his practice stated: 
The practice concentrates on the evaluation and management of patients 
with intractable pain who require opioid medications.  This treatment 
remains controversial and is subject to close scrutiny by state and federal 
regulatory authorities. 
. . . . 
The practice offers Therapeutic Trials of Opioid Medication and Opioid 
Maintenance Therapy.  Opioid therapy is complicated.  These medications 
are potentially dangerous.  They may cause a variety of acute and chronic 
side effects.  Both the administration and the discontinuation of these 
medications require an informed and responsible patient and careful 
medical management.120 
Dr. Hurwitz’s criminal trial began in November 2004.121  During the six-
week trial, the prosecution called more than sixty witnesses and played tapes 
of Hurwitz talking to patients who he did not realize were government 
informants.122  Also during the trial, several past presidents of the American 
Pain Society sent a letter to Hurwitz’s lawyer expressing their dismay at how 
the case was being handled.123 In particular, they cited “misrepresentations” 
 
 118. Id. (alterations in original). 
 119. See Dr. William Hurwitz, at www.drhurwitz.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2000) (former 
Web site, printout on file with author). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Jerry Markon, Pain Doctor Convicted of Drug Charges; Va. Man Faces Possible 
Life Term on Trafficking Counts, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at A1. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Letter from six past presidents of the American Pain Society to Marvin D. Miller, 
attorney for Dr. William Hurwitz (Dec. 10, 2004), at www.aapsonline.org/painman/ 
hurwitzletter.htm (last visited July 23, 2008) (The letter was written by six pain treatment 
experts, including physicians from Johns Hopkins University Medical Center, Albert Einstein 
College of Medicine, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, and Beth Israel Medical 
Center, among others.). 
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by one of the Justice Department’s expert witnesses.124  A similar letter was 
subsequently presented to the presiding judge.125 
On December 15, 2004, a federal jury convicted Hurwitz on fifty 
counts, including drug trafficking, which led to the death of one patient and 
seriously injured two other patients.126  The jury acquitted him of nine other 
counts and deadlocked on three counts.127  The prosecution sought a life 
sentence without parole,128 but the district court sentenced Hurwitz to twenty-
five years in prison.129 
The outcome sent chills through the pain treatment community and was 
criticized by a number of prominent journalists.130  Hurwitz appealed the 
convictions on three grounds, one of which was that the court instructed the 
jury that it could not consider Hurwitz’s “good faith” in his prescribing.131  
Hurwitz argued that “his good faith in issuing the challenged prescriptions 
was relevant to his intent when treating his patients and thus relevant to the 
jury’s determination of whether he acted outside the bounds of accepted 
medical practice or without a legitimate medical purpose.”132 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Letter from Jane M. Orient, Executive Dir., Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc., 
to Leonard D. Wexler, Judge, United States Dist. Ct., E. Dist. of Va. (Feb. 5, 2004), at 
www.aapsonline.org/painman/hurwitzletter2.htm (last visited July 23, 2008).  The letter to the 
judge, sent after conviction and before sentencing, describes the expert medical testimony for 
the prosecution as “false” and “egregious” and the errors of the government’s expert witness 
as “shocking, highly material, and profoundly unjust.” Id. 
 126. Markon, supra note 121. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Rosenberg, supra note 14. 
 129. United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 469 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 130. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 14 (describing Hurwitz as “a prominent doctor 
committed to aggressive treatment of pain” and arguing that, while “[h]is behavior in some 
cases was inexcusable” and he should have supervised patients on large dosages of opioids 
more closely, such malpractice should have been cause for the loss of his medical license 
rather than criminal charges).  To many it appears that he was prosecuted and convicted 
because he prescribed opioids to patients who were drug addicts or subsequently sold their 
pills.  While Hurwitz did terminate patients whom he believed to be abusing their prescriptions, 
he slowly reduced the dosage for most of them because he felt that “cutting off patients was 
tantamount to torture, and he did not do so without strong evidence of bad behavior.” Id.; see 
also Jacob Sullum, The Doctor Is Not a Criminal: A Painful Drug-War Case in Virginia, NAT’L 
REV., May 23, 2005, at 1, 28 (stating that the jurors “confused their role . . . in a criminal 
case with the roles of the state medical board that regulates doctors and the civil courts that 
hear malpractice lawsuits” and that the conviction  “is bound to have a chilling effect on pain 
treatment, which is already scandalously inadequate because of the fear instilled by the war 
on drugs”). 
 131. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 475-76. 
 132. Id. at 476. 
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The court of appeals “agree[d] with Hurwitz that a doctor’s good faith 
generally is relevant to a jury’s determination of whether the doctor acted 
outside the bounds of medical practice or with a legitimate medical purpose 
when prescribing narcotics.”133  The case was retried at the district court 
level with the appropriate instruction in April 2007.134  After deliberating for 
seven days, on April 27th, a jury found Hurwitz guilty on 16 counts of drug 
trafficking, acquitted him on 17 counts, and was unable to reach a verdict 
on the remaining 12 counts.135  On July 13, 2007, the district court judge 
sentenced Hurwitz to fifty-seven months in prison.136  The two and a half 
years he had already served would count toward this term and he would be 
given time off for good behavior.137  While the judge had some sympathy 
for Hurwitz, she felt that the sentence was warranted because Hurwitz was 
“willfully blind” to the actions of his patients who were diverting their 
drugs.138 
D. Dr. Jeri Hassman 
In March 2003, federal officials marched into Dr. Jeri Hassman’s office 
while she was treating a patient, “took off her jewelry, put her in handcuffs 
and led her to jail.”139  Hassman was a specialist in rehabilitation medicine 
and pain management in Tucson, Arizona.140  Before the arrest, the DEA 
placed Hassman and some of her patients under surveillance and sent 
undercover patients to her office to complain about pain.141  She was also 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Jerry Markon, Va. Pain Doctor’s Prison Term Is Cut to 57 Months: Originally 
Sentenced to 25 Years, Specialist Did More Good Than Harm, Judge Says, WASH. POST, July 
14, 2007, at B1. 
 135. Id.; Tierney Lab: Putting Ideas in Science to the Test, http://tierneylab.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2007/04/27/dr-hurwitz-convicted-of-16-drug-trafficking-charges/ (Apr. 27, 
2007, 21:00 EST). 
 136. Transcript of Sentencing at 44-45, United States v. William Eliot Hurwitz, No. 
1:03cr467 (E.D. Va. July 13, 2007). 
 137. Id. at 45, 47. 
 138. See id. at 44 (“[T]here does need to be a reasonable message sent to the people in 
the medical profession that if they practice appropriately and by the right rules . . . they should 
fear nothing, but if they absolutely blind themselves to what are clearly rational, clear signals 
of illegal conduct, then those doctors working with these types of potent medications simply 
have to put the brakes on.”). 
 139. Kaufman, supra note 6. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id.  One informant had been seeking treatment from Dr. Hassman over a four-year 
period and had only received physical therapy for back pain.  A. Bates Butler III, Attorney for 
Dr. Jeri Hassman, Pitfalls of Chronic Pain Management, Presentation to the Arizona Society for 
Healthcare Risk Management 7 (Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with author).  When he complained 
of increased pain and “told her a friend had given him Oxycodone that had helped alleviate 
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under investigation by the Arizona Medical Board, and the Board had 
worked with her by arranging for a mentor, an expert in pain management 
and addiction, to improve her documentation and increase her use of urine 
drug screens.142  This mentoring occurred in September and October 2002, 
but subsequently, without contacting the Arizona Medical Board, the DEA 
suspended Dr. Hassman’s DEA registration (without which she could not 
prescribe controlled substances).143  According to her attorney, “[t]he 
suspension occurred before Dr. Hassman’s records were reviewed by any 
physician.”144  Just two weeks before a hearing on the suspension was 
scheduled, Hassman was indicted145 and “charged with 362 counts of 
prescribing controlled drugs outside the normal practice of medicine.”146 
Based on a news account of her arrest, “[i]n the federal criminal 
complaint against her, the sole allegation [was] that she prescribed 
controlled substances ‘not being in the usual course of professional practice 
and not for any legitimate medical purpose.’”147  The news account further 
reported that the action was taken against Hassman after the DEA tape-
recorded a conversation between her and the state Board.148 
 After her arrest, Hassman issued a press statement in which she 
admitted that there is a problem of drug abusers illegally distributing 
prescription drugs but that, at the same time, there are millions of people 
suffering with severe and chronic pain who need the same prescription 
drugs to help them live a normal life: 
Unfortunately, the DEA and the doctors who treat chronic pain are not 
working collaboratively to meet these important national healthcare 
interests.  Instead an antagonistic relationship has developed between the 
DEA and doctors, where the DEA appears to think that doctors are over-
prescribing pain medication and doctors are trying in good faith to care for 
 
his pain . . . Hassman made the mistake of believing her longtime patient and prescribed 
Oxycodone and then OXYCONTIN for him.  She was indicted for each such prescription.”  Id. 
 142. See Butler, supra note 141. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Kaufman, supra note 6. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. (“Although the right to practice medicine is regulated by state boards, the right to 
prescribe controlled narcotics is regulated by the DEA . . . [i]n Hassman’s case, that working 
relationship became controversial . . . [because] [s]he was not told . . . that DEA agents were 
watching the conversation on closed-circuit television and participating in the interview ‘by 
surreptitious means.’”). 
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their patients under the ever-growing fear of being accused of aiding in 
unlawful drug diversion.149 
Because of the threat of a jail sentence, on January 29, 2004, Dr. 
Hassman “entered a guilty plea to four counts of knowingly comforting or 
assisting four patients who possessed controlled drugs obtained through 
misrepresentation, deception, or fraud—that is, to being an accessory after 
the fact to [her] patients’ crimes.”150  In one of the cases, a pharmacist 
informed Hassman that one of her patients “had filled a prescription for her 
mother, also a patient, and then handed it to an unknown man in the 
parking lot, who drove away.”151  The patient later told Hassman that the 
man in the parking lot was the patient’s nephew.152  The other charges were 
based on a patient who “admitted to possessing some drugs prescribed for 
his deceased father,” a patient who said during an initial office visit that he 
once possessed someone else’s prescription, and two patients who “told 
[Hassman] that a certain patient had stolen part of their prescriptions.”153  In 
these cases, although Dr. Hassman documented these facts in the patient’s 
medical records, she did not call the police.154 
On August 16, 2004, Dr. Hassman was sentenced in federal court.155  
At sentencing, the judge acknowledged that she “ha[d] been punished 
enough by loss of professional standing and most of her practice, as well as 
the destitution resulting from her enormous legal expenses.”156 Nevertheless, 
the judge believed “that a lenient sentence might be an inadequate 
deterrent to the rest of the medical community.”157  While recognizing that 
“some patients do need and benefit from the prescription of opioids,” he 
expressed a greater concern about the “scourge of addiction” that could 
 
 149. Press Statement, Jerri Hassman, M.D. (June 26, 2003), at www.aapsonline.org/ 
painman/hasstatement.htm (last visited July 23, 2008). 
 150. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Jeri Hassman, M.D. Pleads Guilty to Not Ratting 
on Patients, NEWS OF THE DAY…IN PERSPECTIVE, Jan. 31, 2004, at www.aapsonline.org/nod/ 
newsofday39.htm (last visited July 23, 2008).  “Under the terms of the plea agreement, she 
could [have been] sentenced to up to 6 months in prison or up to 5 years probation.  The plea 
agreement enabled her to avoid decades in jail under the sentencing guidelines had she been 
convicted on any one of the 300 counts” with which she was initially charged.  Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Dr. Jeri Hassman Sentenced to Probation, NEWS 
OF THE DAY…IN PERSPECTIVE, Aug. 18, 2004, at www.aapsonline.org/nod/newsofday83.htm 
(last visited July 23, 2008). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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result if physicians did not more stringently control their prescribing 
practices.158  
The judge ultimately imposed a sentence that included “two years of 
probation, plus 100 hours of community service, 50 in a substance abuse 
center and 50 serving nonpaying patients in her office.”159  Hassman was 
permitted to “reapply for her DEA certification one year after the date of the 
plea agreement.”160  The judge, however, conditioned the sentence on a 
requirement that she “publish in a medical journal an exemplary letter 
describing the devastating consequences of her own behavior and the 
righteous prosecution by government, so that others may be influenced.”161 
E. Dr. Ronald McIver 
After teaching and traveling for a number of years, Ronald McIver 
entered Michigan State University to become a doctor of osteopathy 
(D.O.).162  He began practicing pain medicine in Florence, South Carolina, 
in the late 1980s, and after declaring bankruptcy in 2000, moved to 
Greenwood, South Carolina, where he opened a small storefront clinic 
called the Pain Therapy Center.163  According to a news account of his case, 
he was an “unusual doctor” in this day and age in that he spent significant 
amounts of time with his patients—the average visit lasted an hour.164  
While an apparently caring doctor, he neglected the administrative side of 
his practice.165 
McIver was an aggressive pain doctor, prescribing high dosages of 
opioids for many of his patients, but he required his “[p]atients taking 
opioids . . . to sign a pain contract and bring their pills in at each visit to be 
counted.”166  McIver had concerns about whether some of his patients were 
legitimate patients or were diverting their medications.167  As a result, in 
February 2002, he wrote a letter to a state Board of Drug Control (BDC) 
inspector, describing his suspicions.168  He ended the letter stating “‘I 
 
 158. See id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, supra note 155. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Tina Rosenberg, Doctor or Drug Pusher?, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, §6 (Magazine), 
at 48, 52. 
 163. Id. at 50, 52. 
 164. See id. at 52. 
 165. See id. (“While McIver’s treatment rooms were normal, his and his wife’s offices—off 
limits to patients—were a mess . . . . Used syringes, for example, overflowed their storage 
box.”). 
 166. See id. at 50, 52. 
 167. See Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 54. 
 168. Id. 
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certainly don’t want to refuse help to someone who needs it.  On the other 
hand, I want even less to be implicated in diversion or other 
improprieties.’”169  While the BDC agent did nothing with the letter, McIver 
came into the DEA’s crosshairs in July 2002 when a health insurance agent 
was going through files and found that one of his subscribers, Larry Shealy, 
was receiving very large doses of opioids from Dr. McIver.170  The insurance 
agent called the DEA.171 
Larry Shealy began seeing McIver in February 2002.172  Shealy was fifty-
six years old and suffered from “intense back and knee pain” and other 
health problems.173  He was taking OxyContin when he first came to see 
McIver but complained that his pain was still significant.174  McIver 
increased the dose to a level that allowed Shealy to go back to his job in an 
auto body shop.175  Shealy died in his sleep approximately fifteen months 
after he started seeing McIver.176 
McIver was indicted “on fifteen counts related to his treatment of ten 
patients, nine of whom testified for the government at trial.”177  The tenth 
patient was Larry Shealy, whose “death formed the basis of two counts of 
the indictment.”178 
Of the patients who testified against McIver, Leslie Smith, the patient 
who prompted McIver to write the letter to the BDC, gave the most 
damaging testimony.179  Smith admitted he was a drug addict and sought 
out McIver to obtain painkillers after learning from one of his friends that 
McIver readily gave him a prescription for pain medications.180  Smith 
traveled sixty miles each way to see McIver181 and “testified that he lied to 
[McIver] about pain in his wrist, but that [McIver] prescribed high doses of 
OxyContin and Dilaudid, the drugs that Smith requested, without ordering x-
rays.”182  The prosecution presented evidence that McIver must have been 
aware of Smith’s drug use as he discovered a syringe in Smith’s possession 
 
 169. Id. (quoting the February 2002 letter from McIver to Larry McElrath, a state Bureau of 
Drug Control inspector). 
 170. Id. at 52, 54. 
 171. Id. at 52. 
 172. Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 55. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. (stating that McIver doubled Shealy’s dose of OxyContin). 
 176. Id. When he died, Shealy “had OxyContin pills in his stomach” and “the levels of 
drugs were consistent with the prescriptions McIver had been writing.” Id. 
 177. United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 553 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 178. Id. at 553. 
 179. Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 52, 54. 
 180. McIver, 470 F.3d at 554 (citing Joint Appendix at 175-76). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 554 (citing Joint Appendix at 178, 180-83). 
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during an office visit.183  Despite this fact, after Smith told McIver that he 
used the syringe for fishing, McIver continued to prescribe the drugs for 
him.184 
The others who testified were also either drug addicts or drug diverters 
who lied to McIver about their use of the drugs.185  Apparently, the jury 
believed the prosecution’s claim that McIver knew or, at least, should have 
known that these individuals were abusing or diverting the drugs he 
prescribed and convicted McIver of one count of conspiracy to distribute 
controlled substances unlawfully,186 six counts of unlawful distribution of a 
controlled substance,187 and two counts of unlawful distribution of a 
controlled substance that led to Larry Shealy’s death.188  He was sentenced 
to concurrently serve thirty years in prison for Shealy’s death and twenty 
years for the other counts.189 
A New York Times article published after the court decision raised 
questions about whether Shealy’s death was related to the drugs McIver 
prescribed.190  Although the prosecutor’s toxicologist concluded that the 
OxyContin and Roxicodone that McIver prescribed “caused Shealy’s death 
by respiratory depression,” there was evidence that Shealy had been taking 
the same amount of the drugs for at least two months before he died.191  
According to pain specialists, death by respiratory suppression is unlikely 
when the dosage of such drugs is consistent.192  Moreover, there was also a 
significant possibility that Shealy’s death might have been caused by 
“advanced congestive heart failure.”193 
McIver appealed the trial court decision to the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit on several grounds.194  The crux of McIver’s argument was 
that the jury was allowed “to convict on a civil, rather than a criminal, 
 
 183. Id. at 554 (citing Joint Appendix at 185). 
 184. Id. at 554-55 (citing Joint Appendix at 185). 
 185. See McIver, 470 F.3d at 554-57 (discussing the cases of six patients who received 
prescriptions from McIver). 
 186. Id. at 553 (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000)). 
 187. Id. (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000)). 
 188. Id. (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C) (2000)). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 55. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. The grounds included that the jury instructions “improperly lowered the government’s 
burden of proof,” that the prosecution’s medical expert’s testimony “constituted inadmissible 
legal opinions,” that “the district court erred in excluding evidence from [McIver’s] expert 
witness,” and that “there was insufficient evidence to support each of his convictions.”  McIver, 
470 F.3d at 557. 
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standard of proof.”195  Despite acknowledging that there is potential for jury 
confusion as to the civil standard of care applied in medical malpractice 
cases and the criminal standard of proof required in these prosecutions, the 
Fourth Circuit rejected McIver’s arguments and upheld the district court’s 
decision.196  Interviews with jurors after the trial, however, indicated some 
confusion over the standard, with a number indicating that what was most 
influential to their decision was the amount and dosages of drugs 
prescribed,197 rather than knowledge or intent to divert or prescribe to feed 
an addict’s habit. 
III.  THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT—A CLASH OF CULTURES 
The scrutiny and prosecution of these physicians is a useful foundation 
for an examination of the clash between a medical view regarding 
appropriate prescribing of opioids for pain treatment and a law enforcement 
perspective that such drugs are dangerous and have the potential for abuse 
and diversion.  But, these prosecutions also represent a more deep-seated 
adversariness, akin to animosity, between the two groups.  This animosity is 
evident in the language used by each side when describing the other.  War 
and terrorism are major themes in the rhetoric of both sides.  While 
government prosecutors have long referred to their activities against drug 
diversion as part of a “war on drugs,” they have also likened doctors who 
prescribe large doses of opioids to terrorists, stating that they will “root 
[them] out like the Taliban.”198  Pain advocates have responded in kind, 
referring to the government’s efforts as “a war on pain doctors,” “a 
government jihad,” and “state-sponsored terrorism.”199  Media reports add 
fuel to this rhetoric, describing the DEA as using “hardball tactics,” including 
“storming clinics in SWAT-style gear, ransacking offices, and hauling off 
doctors in handcuffs.”200 
State and federal prosecutors have also used the language of organized 
crime.  They have referred to arrested doctors as “being no different than 
 
 195. See id. 
 196. Id. at 558. 
 197. Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 55. 
 198. See Melinda Ammann, The Agony and the Ecstasy: How the OxyContin Crackdown 
Hurts Patients in Pain, REASON, Apr. 2003, at 28, 33 (quoting Gene Rossi, an Alexandria, 
Virginia, federal prosecutor); see also White, supra note 94 (quoting former Attorney General 
John Ashcroft, who stated that “[t]he indictment and arrests in Virginia demonstrate our 
commitment to bring to justice all those who traffic in this very dangerous drug . . . . We will 
continue to pursue vigorously physicians, patients and others who are responsible for turning 
OxyContin from a legitimate painkiller to a vehicle of addiction and death.”). 
 199. Frank Owen, The DEA’s War on Pain Doctors, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 5-11, 2003, at 
40. 
 200. Id. 
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drug kingpins or crack dealers” and call their patients drug addicts.201  Pain 
advocates, in contrast, refer to these doctors as pioneers and even 
heroes,202 and patients as vulnerable and suffering human beings.203  The 
two sides also characterize the drugs that are the focus of regulation very 
differently.  OxyContin, for example, is characterized by drug enforcement 
officials as “a seductive, deadly menace,”204 whereas pain physicians and 
patients refer to it as “a miracle drug.”205 
The language of each side, in and of itself, provides evidence of the rift 
between the two groups and may also illustrate the historical tension 
between them and the inherent culture of each profession.  Prosecutors 
appear deeply distrustful of addicts or anyone using large quantities of 
narcotics.  That suspicion carries over to anyone willing to help an addict or 
trust him.  This suspicion likely results from their training and indoctrination.  
In contrast, physicians talk of the need to trust their patients, to listen to 
them, to prevent their pain and suffering, and to engender their trust.  
Without such patient trust, they are trained to believe, they will be unable to 
establish a therapeutic relationship, i.e., patients will not confide in them or 
share with them information that is essential for accurate diagnosis and 
treatment.  In addition, physicians are trained to make independent medical 
judgments and value their autonomy in this regard.  Efforts by prosecutors 
and regulators to determine what is a “legitimate medical purpose” invades 
physicians’ exclusive turf and seriously threatens their professional integrity.  
The cavernous schism between the two sides appears to prevent rational 
exploration of the issue and cooperative means of dealing with the problem. 
IV.  THE HISTORY OF U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT RELATED TO PHYSICIAN 
PRESCRIBING 
The recent altercations between physicians and law enforcement agents 
over the prescribing of opioids is actually part of an ongoing historical 
struggle between the two groups as to what counts as the practice of 
medicine and who has the authority to decide what constitutes the practice 
of medicine in the context of physicians prescribing controlled substances.  
The modern drug regulatory scheme has its roots in the late nineteenth 
 
 201. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 6; Markon, supra note 134. 
 202. See, e.g., Ralph Vartabedian, Painful Rift Unnerves Doctors: The Clash over the Use 
of Opioids to Treat Patients Intensifies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2003, at A1; Owen, supra note 
199. 
 203. See, e.g., Markon, supra note 134. 
 204. Ammann, supra note 198, at 30. 
 205. See Timothy Roche, The Potent Perils of a Miracle Drug: OxyContin is a Leading 
Treatment for Chronic Pain, but Officials Fear It May Succeed Crack Cocaine on the Street, 
TIME, Jan. 8, 2001, at 47. 
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century, when policymakers began “to define the boundaries of appropriate 
sale and use of drug products.”206  These standards were created about the 
time that some medical professionals began defining drug addiction as a 
disease that needed to be treated by health professionals, with some calling 
for all narcotics to be banned from sale, except with medical approval.207 
 It was not until 1914, when Congress passed the Harrison Narcotics 
Act, that federal law addressed the issue of the non-medical use of 
narcotics.208  As a result of the then prevailing constitutional view that 
Congress had limited power to create penal laws (because police powers 
were reserved to the states), the Harrison Act was drafted simply as a tax law 
requiring those authorized to manufacture and/or distribute “opium, coca 
leaves and all their compounds and derivatives to register [with the local 
internal revenue office], pay a fee, and keep records of all such drugs in 
their possession.”209  A narcotics division was established in the U.S. 
Treasury Department to enforce the law.210 
The Harrison Act made possession of narcotics by any unregistered 
person unlawful unless the drugs were obtained from a physician who was 
registered under the Act, prescribed “in the course of his professional 
 
 206. Spillane & McAllister, supra note 12, at S5. 
 207. Id. at S6.  In addition to balancing concerns about addiction and therapeutic benefit, 
early efforts to regulate the sale of these drugs sought to address health professionals’ 
concerns about control of the drug supply.  See id.  The American Medical Association, which 
had recently been established, was seeking to “control the distribution of medicines under 
physicians.”  Duane C. McBride et al., Alternative Perspectives on the Drug Policy Debate, in 
THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE 9, 11 (James A. Inciardi ed., 2d ed. 1999).  Large 
pharmaceutical companies were being established and driven by profit rather than concerns 
over the public’s health.  See Spillane & McAllister, supra note 12, at S6.  In addition to an 
increased volume of drugs manufactured by these companies, a large quantity of “patent 
medicines” was being marketed directly to consumers.  See DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN 
DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 14-15 (3d ed. 1999).  Many physicians and 
pharmacists and their respective emerging trade associations (the American Medical 
Association and the American Pharmaceutical Association) advocated that dispensing of 
narcotics be limited to these professionals.  Id. at 11, 14-15. 
 208. See Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) 
(repealed 1970).  Prior to that time, there was no real distinction between therapeutic and 
recreational or illicit drugs.  See Jeffrey Clayton Foster, The Rocky Road to a “Drug-Free 
Tennessee”: A History of the Early Regulation of Cocaine and the Opiates, 1897-1913, 29 J. 
SOC. HIST. 547, 547 (1996).  Narcotics were widely available and could be purchased 
without a physician’s prescription at local drugstores.  See id.  Even substances such as heroin 
and barbiturates were advertised in the 1904 Sears catalog.  See McBride et al., supra note 
207, at 11. 
 209. JAMES C. WEISSMAN, DRUG ABUSE: THE LAW AND TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES 117 (1978); 
see also MUSTO, supra note 207, at 54-68 (discussing the movement that led to the passage 
of the Harrison Act). 
 210. See Harrison Act, § 2(a), 38 Stat. at 786. 
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practice,” and kept records of the amount dispensed or distributed and the 
name and address of the patient to whom the drugs were dispensed or 
distributed.211  According to one author, “in effect, the Act criminalized non-
medically authorized possession, use, and distribution of opiates and 
cocaine . . . [and] was the first time in the history of the United States that 
criminal sanctions were being imposed upon what previously had been 
considered a purely medical matter.”212   
 The Harrison Act afforded physicians a good deal of discretion in 
prescribing narcotics for medical purposes, yet, even at that time, drug 
control enforcers and physicians frequently came into conflict.  As historical 
expert David Musto pointed out, “legal definitions could not easily 
distinguish between well-meaning overuse, use in error, and indiscriminate 
dispensing that led to addiction.”213  When doctors were brought into court 
on charges that they were prescribing narcotics for non-medical purposes, 
they simply countered that they were practicing legitimate medicine.214  
While drugs were also still being distributed by non-physicians, physicians 
were a much easier target for law enforcement agents.215 
 A considerable point of contention after passage of the Act was the 
treatment of drug addicts.  Federal drug agents “opposed any form of 
narcotics distribution and harassed physicians who dared to pursue narcotic 
treatment efforts.”216  Many physicians, on the other hand, “felt that the 
agonies of unrelieved addiction were as much encompassed in their 
Hippocratic Oath as any other human suffering.”217  The question of 
whether the Act allowed the treatment or maintenance of addicts was 
addressed in a series of Supreme Court opinions, which seemed to vacillate 
on the issue, arguably as a result of the revenue origin of the Act, but also, 
perhaps, as a result of changes in the way that society viewed addicts.218  
Over a six-year period starting in 1916, the Court went from viewing the Act 
as not preventing physicians from prescribing to addicts, as it was simply a 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 117. 
 213. MUSTO, supra note 207, at 92. 
 214. Id. at 93-94. 
 215. See, e.g., id. at 94 (“Professionals could be made to conform to law much more 
effectively than unlicensed peddlers or pushers.”). 
 216. WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 118. 
 217. Rufus G. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the 
Sick, 62 YALE L.J. 736, 739 (1953). 
 218. See MUSTO, supra note 207, at 132-34 (discussing the “change in judicial outlook 
between 1915 and 1919 with regard to addiction maintenance”). 
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revenue act,219 to saying that prescribing to an addict “for the purpose of 
providing the user with morphine sufficient to keep him comfortable by 
maintaining his customary use” was not in the “course of professional 
treatment,”220 to adopting a view that professional practice did not include 
medication for the purpose of curing an addict.221 
 These Supreme Court “cases clearly established that registered 
physicians were permitted to prescribe and dispense narcotic drugs strictly 
within the bounds of their professional practice”222 and that maintenance 
therapy for addicts was not within such bounds.  They set the stage for 
“practitioner investigations and prosecutions for years to come.”223 
According to Rufus King, an early anti-drug law advocate, starting in the 
1920s, “the Narcotics Division launched a reign of terror, threatening 
 
 219. See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916) (affirming the district court’s 
decision to quash an indictment against Dr. Jin Fuey Moy for prescribing morphine to an 
addict). 
 220. Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1919); see also United States v. 
Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 90 (1919) (upholding the conviction of a doctor whose indictment 
charged that the defendant physician sold “five hundred one-sixth grain tablets of heroin not 
in the course of the regular professional practice . . . and not for the treatment of any disease 
from which [his patient] was suffering but as was well known by [the defendant], [his patient] 
was addicted to the use of the drug as a habit, being a person popularly known as a ‘dope 
fiend,’ and that [the defendant sold] . . . the drug, heroin, to [his patient] for the purpose of 
gratifying his appetite for the drug”). 
 221. See United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 286 (1922) (“[D]efendant did not 
dispense any of the drugs for the purpose of treating any disease or condition other than 
[morphine, heroin, or cocaine] addiction.”(emphasis added)); see also King, supra note 217, 
at 743 (asserting that the Solicitor General issued a trick indictment broadening the case to 
include “whether the so-called ‘ambulatory treatment’ of drug addicts by a physician is or is 
not, as a matter of law, prohibited by section 2 of the Harrison Narcotic Act.” (quoting Brief on 
Behalf of the United States at 7, Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, No. 582 (1922)). 
 222. Stephen E. Stone, The Investigation and Prosecution of Professional Practice Cases 
Under the Controlled Substances Act: Introduction to Professional Practice Case Law and 
Investigations, 10 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 21, 22 (1983). 
 223. Id.  The change in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act is attributed in part to 
“radical social change.”  Aryeh Y. Brown, Comment, In Memoriam: Ralph Seeley, Obscured 
by Smoke: Medicinal Marijuana and the Need for Representation Reinforcement Review, 22 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175, 210 (1998) (citing MUSTO, supra note 207, at 132).  Between the 
initial and second Jin Fuey Moy decisions, “[t]he country underwent profound changes . . . .  
World War I had been fought, the Eighteenth Amendment had been adopted in a spirit of 
moralistic fervor, ‘and the liberalizing movements of La-Follette, Theodore Roosevelt, and 
Wilson had declined into a fervent and intolerant nationalism.’”  Id. (quoting MUSTO, supra 
note 207, at 132-33). In addition, there was 
an enormous fear of Bolsheviks and anarchists which gave rise to the Red Scare of 
1919-20.  Narcotics came to be associated with perversion and rebellion, addiction 
was perceived as a threat to the war effort and to the nation, and maintenance of 
addicts in clinics or by individual physicians was considered immoral and unpatriotic. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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doctors who had anything further to do with drug addicts, and sending a 
goodly number of recalcitrant practitioners off to prison.”224  Yet, these 
offenders often were respected members of the community and the “ratio 
between arrests and convictions remained notably low, indicating abusive 
use of the indictment processes.”225 
 During the time that these cases were making their way to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, addicts continued to be treated in “morphine maintenance 
clinics.”226  However, in the early 1920s, largely in response to a “global 
moral crusade” the clinics were forced to close, and addicts were left to seek 
out sympathetic individual physicians or obtain their drugs illegally, on the 
street through a thriving black market.227  Then, in 1925, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled in Linder v. United States228 that physicians could prescribe 
narcotics to assist addicts in withdrawal as long as they did so in 
conformance with accepted medical practice.229  In Linder, a physician who 
was registered under the Act gave a patient, who the government argued 
the physician knew was addicted to narcotics, one tablet of morphine and 
three tablets of cocaine.230  At issue was whether the physician was 
dispensing the drugs within the bounds of his professional practice.231  The 
physician argued that what is meant by “in the course of . . . professional 
 
 224. RUFUS KING, THE DRUG HANG UP: AMERICA’S FIFTY-YEAR FOLLY 43 (1974). 
 225. Id. at 44. “[I]n 1920, 3,477 arrests produced 908 convictions; in 1921, 4,014 
arrests produced 1,583; at the peak, in 1925, 10,297 federal arrests produced 5,600 
convictions.”  Id. 
 226. See WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 117. 
 227. Id. at 117-18. 
 228. 268 U.S. 5 (1925). 
 229. Id. at 22.  The petitioner alleged that prior to this case, the lower courts had, “without 
any sufficient reason,”  “engrafted” onto the exception of the Act (that a physician who 
dispenses or distributes narcotics in the course of his professional practice need not prescribe 
on an official form) “the further requirement that the dispensing or distribution must . . . have 
been . . . in good faith as a medicine, and not to satisfy the cravings of an addict.”  Brief of 
Petitioner at 8, Linder, 268 U.S. 5, No. 183 (1924). 
 230. 268 U.S. at 11, 15-16.  According to one source, 
Dr. Charles O. Linder, completing a lifetime of honorable practice in Spokane, 
Washington, was induced by one of Treasury’s addict stool-pigeons to write a 
prescription for four tablets of cocaine and morphine.  (At the trial the doctor claimed 
she told him she was in great pain from a stomach ailment, and that her regular 
physician was unavailable; she swore she had disclosed to him that she was a drug 
addict.)  Several Treasury agents thereupon descended on his office on a Saturday 
afternoon, stomped through his waiting room crowded with patients, and broke in on 
him in the midst of a consultation.  After a rough-and-tumble search of the premises, 
they dragged him off to jail. 
KING, supra note 224, at 44-45. 
 231. Linder, 268 U.S. at 17, 22-23. 
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practice . . . cannot be answered by the application of any hard and fast 
rule” and that 
[i]t is the business of the physician to alleviate the pain and suffering of 
patients as well as to effectuate their cure.  If we are to believe the literature 
on the subject, the suffering of an addict caused by deprivation of his 
customary drug is as intense as any suffering caused by disease.  It is 
perhaps more so in the insistent demand for relief.  Why should not the 
physician in the course of his ordinary practice take cognizance of that fact 
and administer temporary relief?  Why should the law be construed as 
intended to prohibit such an act of mercy?  It is, we submit, a strained 
construction of the law to hold that the language in question was intended 
to prohibit such an act . . . .232 
The Court ultimately confirmed its earlier interpretation that the Act must 
be construed and applied as a revenue act.233  In addition, the Court took 
the opportunity to limit the holding of its prior rulings on this issue, stating 
that earlier opinions “cannot be accepted as authority for holding that a 
physician, who acts bona fide and according to fair medical standards, may 
never give an addict moderate amounts of drugs for self-administration in 
order to relieve conditions incident to addiction.”234  
 Despite the ruling in Linder, federal narcotics agents “continued to 
vigorously and indiscriminately investigate all physicians prescribing 
narcotics to addicts.”235  Addiction continued to be viewed as a “vice” rather 
than as a treatable disease and certain drugs were “stripped of their healing 
properties.”236  Physicians, even those prescribing within legal bounds, 
became fearful of narcotics agents.  According to Musto, “[t]he social and 
economic position of the registered physician was so sensitive, trials so time-
consuming, and appeals so long and costly, that hostile agents could make 
cases against physicians with impunity and nearly ruin them whether charges 
were warranted or not.”237 
In the 1930s, controversy remained over the treatment of addicts from 
both a medical and legal perspective and the regulation of narcotics 
 
 232. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 229, at 11. 
 233. See Linder, 268 U.S. at 22-23 (“We find no facts alleged in the indictment sufficient 
to show that petitioner had done anything falling within definite inhibitions or sufficient 
materially to imperil orderly collection of revenue from sales. . . . The unfortunate condition of 
the recipient certainly created no reasonable probability that she would sell or otherwise 
dispose of the few tablets intrusted to her; and we cannot say that by so dispensing them the 
doctor necessarily transcended the limits of that professional conduct with which Congress 
never intended to interfere.”). 
 234. Id. at 22. 
 235. WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 118. 
 236. Brown, supra note 223, at 212. 
 237. MUSTO, supra note 207, at 185. 
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expanded.238  In 1930, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics was established 
under the Treasury Department’s control,239 and in 1932, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the 
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, a model for state legislatures that criminalized 
the possession, use, and distribution of opiates and cocaine.240  The model 
ultimately was adopted by every state in some form and increased uniformity 
among state laws.241 
From 1930 to the late 1960s, federal drug policy was largely a matter 
for the police and was enforced by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.242  
Then, in 1968 Congress established the Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs, replacing the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.243  It was 
housed in the Justice Department, rather than the Treasury, and was 
assigned responsibility for enforcement of the federal drug laws.244  The shift 
in the department housing the enforcement agency symbolized a shift in 
policy from a tax- to a regulatory-based perspective.  
 In 1970, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (CSA),245 
which is the modern day tool used to regulate narcotics and other controlled 
substances.246  It was also the beginning of President Nixon’s “war on 
drugs,” a war that continues today247 and is the root of current tensions 
between physicians treating pain and the government.  The CSA replaced 
the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 but is broader in scope, regulating both 
 
 238. See WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 118. 
 239. Act of June 14, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-357, 46 Stat. 585. 
 240. UNIFORM NARCOTIC DRUG ACT (1932), reprinted in WILLIAM BUTLER ELDRIDGE, 
NARCOTICS AND THE LAW: A CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT IN NARCOTIC DRUG 
CONTROL app. A, at 161, 163-64 (2d ed. rev. 1967). 
 241. WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 118-19. 
 242. DAVID F. MUSTO & PAMELA KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL: POLITICS AND 
FEDERAL POLICY IN A PERIOD OF INCREASING SUBSTANCE ABUSE, 1963-1981, at x (2002). 
 243. See MUSTO, supra note 207, at 240. This new agency was a consolidation of the 
prior Bureau of Narcotics (formerly located in the Treasury Department) and the Bureau of 
Drug Abuse Control (formerly located in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). 
Id. 
 244. Id. at 240-41. 
 245. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000)). 
 246. Controlled substances covered by the CSA are drugs that have the potential for abuse 
and dependence. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (including the potential for abuse and dependence in 
the descriptions of each of the five “schedules” of drugs the CSA covers). 
 247. Robert Pavlan, The Federal Controlled Substances Act, PHARMACY L. UPDATE (Ne. Univ. 
Bouvé Coll. of Health Sci., Sch. of Pharmacy, Continuing Educ., Boston, Ma.), 2002, at 1; 
see DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: A TRADITION OF 
EXCELLENCE, 1973-2003, at 13-14, available at www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/history/ 
history_part1.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2008); see also MUSTO, supra note 207, at 248-50 
(discussing Nixon’s war on drugs). 
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narcotic and non-narcotic substances (e.g., barbiturates, amphetamines, 
and anabolic steroids).248  The CSA and its attendant regulations provide for 
intensive record keeping and tracking of all organizations and individuals 
involved in the distribution of controlled substances.249  The CSA is 
administered and enforced by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
which was established in 1973 and is a unit of the FBI within the U.S. 
Department of Justice.250 
 The CSA classifies controlled substances into one of five schedules 
based on their potential for abuse, psychological or physiological 
dependence, and medical uses.251  Schedule I drugs are substances which 
have a high potential for abuse and no current medical use.252  They 
include substances such as heroin, LSD, marijuana,253 and 
methaqualone.254  Schedule II substances, which also have a high potential 
for abuse, have a currently accepted use in medical treatment but are, in 
general, accepted for medical use only with severe restrictions.255  This 
group includes morphine, cocaine, methadone, oxycodone, and injectable 
forms of methamphetamine.256  Several of these drugs are used to control 
chronic and/or acute pain.257  Schedules III–V substances have a potential 
for abuse which is lower than substances in Schedules I and II but also have 
 
 248. See MUSTO, supra note 207, at 255; WEISSMAN, supra note 209, at 124.  Also, 
unlike the Harrison Narcotics Act, which was based on the federal government’s taxing power, 
the CSA is based on the federal government’s power to regulate interstate commerce.  Early 
constitutional attacks on the statute were unsuccessful, and the “federal courts have upheld 
Congress’ authority to enact the statute based on its power to regulate interstate commerce.”  
Pavlan, supra note 247, at 1. 
 249. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 821-830 (2000) (“Part C - Registration of Manufacturers, 
Distributors, and Dispensers of Controlled Substances”); Pavlan, supra note 247, at 7-9. 
 250. Pavlan, supra note 247, at 2; see DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 247, at 7, 
9, 13-14. 
 251. Pavlan, supra note 247, at 1-2; see 21 U.S.C. § 812 (defining the five schedules and 
requiring annual updates to be republished at 21 C.F.R. § 1308). 
 252. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1); see MUSTO, supra note 207, at 255. 
 253. Although “[t]he use of medical marijuana has been approved by voter referendum in 
several western states . . . [u]nder federal law, marijuana has never been proven safe and 
effective for use in the treatment of any medical condition [and] [i]t is still listed as a Schedule I 
controlled substance.”  Pavlan, supra note 247, at 10. 
 254. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 Schedule I (2008). 
 255. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2); see also MUSTO, supra note 207, at 255 (stating that 
“Schedule Two contains the most dangerous prescribable drugs”). 
 256. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12 Schedule II (2008). 
 257. See Marcia L. Meldrum, A Capsule History of Pain Management, 290 JAMA 2470, 
2474 (2003); MUSTO, supra note 207, at 255. 
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acceptable medical uses.258  Drugs in each Schedule are subject to different 
rules for prescribing and distribution.259 
Along with the Schedule structure, the CSA requires practitioners who 
prescribe a substance contained in the five schedules to register with the 
Attorney General.260  Only registrants acting in compliance with the law are 
excepted from the criminal provisions of the Act which make it “unlawful for 
any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to . . . distribute, or dispense, . . . 
a controlled substance.”261  Because these substances are necessary for 
treatment of many patients, virtually all practicing physicians register with the 
DEA. 
Physicians prescribing controlled substances must do so in accordance 
with the regulations governing registrants.  These regulations require that 
prescriptions of controlled substances “must be . . . for a legitimate medical 
purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his 
professional practice.”262  Since the CSA was enacted, courts, in numerous 
cases, have struggled with applying this language.263  Early cases continued 
to deal with the treatment of addicts, particularly the prescribing of 
methadone, and whether prescribing was being done for purposes of pain 
relief or “under the guise of a ‘detoxification program.’”264  Whether 
prescribing for addiction treatment was for a “legitimate medical purpose” 
was largely dealt with by the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act’s passage in 
1974.265  The Act responded to the widespread use, at the time, of 
methadone to treat heroin addiction and “the unique and unusually great 
risks of diversion and criminal profiteering associated with maintenance 
programs.”266  While clear guidelines were developed for the prescribing of 
 
 258. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(3)-(5); see 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.13-1308.15 (2008). 
 259. 21 U.S.C. §§ 821-830 (2000) (“Part C - Registration of Manufacturers, Distributors, 
and Dispensers of Controlled Substances).  For example, prescriptions may not be written for 
Schedule I substances.  Prescribing regulations for the drugs in the other groups specify 
requirements for refilling prescriptions, oral prescriptions, partial filling of prescriptions, and 
labeling of substances prescribed.  See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.07 (2008). 
 260. 21 U.S.C. § 823. 
 261. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). 
 262. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2008). 
 263. See S. REP. NO. 93-192, at 7-9 (1973) (reporting on the Methadone Diversion 
Control Act of 1973, S. 1115, 93d Cong. (1973)). 
 264. Id. at 7. 
 265. See id. at 11.  Shortly after passing the CSA, Congress passed the Narcotic Addict 
Treatment Act of 1974 (NATA), which established a mechanism for treating addicts outside the 
mainstream practice of medicine.  Pub. L. No. 93-281, 88 Stat. 124 (1974). 
 266. S. REP. NO. 93-192, at 12. The Act was a response to a new development in medical 
treatment, i.e., “the widespread use of the narcotic drug methadone both to detoxify and to 
maintain heroin addicts.”  Id. at 11.  Under NATA and its implementing regulations, 
practitioners who wish to administer and dispense methadone “for maintenance and 
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narcotics to treat addiction, similar guidelines do not exist for prescribing of 
pain medications to treat chronic pain, creating an environment of 
uncertainty and legal risk for physicians treating this population. 
V.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE USE OF OPIOIDS FOR TREATMENT OF CHRONIC PAIN 
Opium was regarded as a virtual panacea by the medical profession 
throughout much of the nineteenth century.267  The drug had many uses,268  
but “it was particularly prized for its analgesic properties because of the lack 
of alternative pain-relieving agents at this time.”269 
 While opioids were used regularly in hospitals to relieve acute pain due 
to injury or surgery, they were not used for pain of longer duration until 
relatively recently.270  The modern use of opioids for pain treatment arising 
from disease grew out of the hospice movement of the 1960s, when it was 
established that opioids were highly effective in treating cancer pain.271  This 
movement was largely limited to terminally ill patients, but the use of opioids 
outside the hospice setting began to permeate more traditional medical 
practices as evidence began to mount that people in pain who received 
opioids did not become addicted to them.272  In the late 1980s, opioids had 
 
detoxification treatment must obtain a separate DEA registration as a Narcotic Treatment 
Program.”  OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL: AN 
INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 23 (2006), available at 
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/manuals/pract/pract_manual012508.pdf (last visited July 
23, 2008).  More recently, Congress passed the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, 
allowing physicians who obtain a waiver and certification in addiction from a designated 
medical specialty board to treat opioid addiction or dependence by prescribing buprenorphine 
drug products.  See Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, §§ 3501-
3502, 114 Stat. 1222, 1222-27 (2000) (amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 823(g), 824 (2000)). 
 267. See MUSTO, supra note 207, at 1. 
 268. Id.  Prior to the late 1800s, opioids had been used as a “soothe-all” for all types of 
medical problems, from spasms, restlessness, and allergies to depression.  See id. at 75.  It 
was only after newer approaches to medical treatment became available that wide ranging 
uses of opium became understood as “unscientific, unprofessional, and an indulgence fraught 
with danger.”  Id. 
 269. Foster, supra note 208, at 548. 
 270. See Kaufman, supra note 6 (“Until the mid-1980s, the law enforcement concern 
trumped the therapeutic value, and opioids were not widely used outside hospitals.”). 
 271. See Meldrum, supra note 257, at 2473 (describing the “Formation of the Pain 
Field”). 
 272. See Randal D. France et al., Long-Term Use of Narcotic Analgesics in Chronic Pain, 
19 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1379, 1380-81 (1984); William E. Hurwitz, Pain Control in the Police 
State of Medicine (Part II), 8 J. AM. PHYS. & SURGEONS 13, 13 (2003) (“Beginning in the mid-
1980s, there was a reconsideration of the previous rejection of opioid therapy for non-
malignant pain.  Encouraging clinical experience with chronic opioid administration to cancer 
patients and to methadone-maintained addicts dispelled fears of this therapeutic modality . . . 
. Early research indicated that patients without a prior history of addiction ran little risk of 
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become the standard of care for treatment of moderate to severe cancer 
pain.273  It was not until 1990, however, when the World Health 
Organization published guidelines on cancer pain treatment,274 that the 
standard was more widely acknowledged.  Subsequently, in 1992, the 
American Pain Society published Principles on Analgesic Medication for 
Acute Pain and Cancer Pain,275 and in 1994, the Agency for Health Care 
Policy and Research (now the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
(AHRQ)), established that opioids, in combination with other medications, 
were the appropriate treatment for chronic malignant pain.276 
 In 1996, for the first time, professional groups addressed guidelines for 
the treatment of chronic nonmalignant pain.  The American Academy of 
Pain Medicine and the American Pain Society jointly issued a statement 
entitled The Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Chronic Pain (also referred 
to as the “Consensus Statement”).277  The Consensus Statement “provided 
guidance for regulatory agencies for determining accepted principles of 
practice for the use of opioids for chronic pain patients” and “indicated that 
in initially evaluating a patient a complete history and physical examination 
should be conducted.”278  Moreover, the Consensus Statement 
recommended that physicians develop an individualized treatment plan 
including “different types of treatment modalities” and that in certain cases 
“[c]onsultation with a specialist in pain medicine or with a psychologist may 
 
becoming addicted through pain treatment with opioids.”); Russell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M. 
Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain: Report of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 
171, 184 (1986) (concluding that “opioid medications can be safely and effectively 
prescribed to selected patients with relatively little risk of producing the maladaptive behaviors 
which define opioid abuse. . . . [H]owever, this course must be pursued cautiously.”); Jane 
Porter & Hershel Jick, Letter to the Editor, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics, 
302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 123 (1980); see also Richard M. Marks & Edward J. Sachar, 
Undertreatment of Medical Inpatients with Narcotic Analgesics, 78 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 
173 (1973) (concluding that misconceptions about effective doses of narcotic analgesics and 
exaggeration of the dangers of addiction lead to undertreatment of and needless suffering in 
medical inpatients); see generally John P. Morgan, American Opiophobia: Customary 
Underutilization of Opioid Analgesics, 5 ADVANCES ALCOHOL & SUBSTANCE ABUSE 163 (1985). 
 273. Hurwitz, supra note 272, at 13. 
 274. EXPERT COMM. ON CANCER PAIN RELIEF AND ACTIVE SUPPORTIVE CARE, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., WHO TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 804: CANCER PAIN RELIEF AND PALLIATIVE CARE (1990). 
 275. See AM. PAIN SOC’Y, PRINCIPLES OF ANALGESIC USE IN THE TREATMENT OF ACUTE PAIN 
AND CANCER PAIN (3d ed. 1992). 
 276. See AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINE NO. 9: MANAGEMENT OF CANCER PAIN (1994). 
 277. See AM. ACAD. OF PAIN MED. & AM. PAIN SOC’Y, THE USE OF OPIOIDS FOR THE 
TREATMENT OF CHRONIC PAIN (1996), available at www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/ 
455/opioidschronicpain.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) [hereinafter CONSENSUS STATEMENT]. 
 278. Paul W. Saxton, Continuation of Registration, 64 Fed. Reg. 25,073, 25,075 (Drug 
Enforcement Admin. May 10, 1999); see CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 277, at 3. 
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be warranted.”279  Of significant note, the Consensus Statement also 
provided that “[t]he management of pain in patients with a history of 
addiction or a comorbid psychiatric disorder requires special consideration, 
but does not necessarily contraindicate the use of opioids.”280 
 In 1998, the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) issued Model 
Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain.281  
These Guidelines give clear direction to physicians and to state medical 
boards regarding opioid use for chronic pain.  Like the Consensus 
Statement, the Guidelines require a physician evaluating a pain patient to 
take a complete medical history and conduct a physical examination.282  
They also require the physician to set a written treatment plan with 
objectives, to conduct reasonable follow-ups to continue or modify therapy, 
to comply with applicable controlled substance laws and regulations, and to 
document everything accurately and completely.283  Moreover, “[w]hen a 
physician determines that a patient is at risk for medication abuse or has a 
history of substance abuse, the guidelines suggest a written agreement 
between the physician and patient outlining patient responsibilities.”284  After 
1998, many state medical boards adopted policies consistent with the 
FSMB’s Model Guidelines.285 
While the 1990s became the decade in which the medical profession 
began to recognize the benefits of opioids for the treatment of chronic pain 
 
 279. Paul W. Saxton, Continuation of Registration, 64 Fed. Reg. at 25,075; see 
CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 277, at 3. 
 280. CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 277, at 3. 
 281. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF THE U.S., MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PAIN, available at www.nsmadocs.org/pdf/ 
ModelGuidelines.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008). 
 282. Id. at SECTION II(1) EVALUATION OF THE PATIENT. 
 283. Id. at TREATMENT PLAN, PERIODIC REVIEW, MEDICAL RECORDS, COMPLIANCE WITH 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES LAWS AND REGULATIONS. 
 284. Larry K. Houck, The Drug Enforcement Administration, Controlled Substances and 
Pain Management, 1 DEA- INDUSTRY COMMUNICATOR: SPECIAL OXYCONTIN ISSUE (Drug 
Enforcement Admin., Wash. D.C.), 2001, at 10, 13. 
 285. See PAIN & POL’Y STUDIES GROUP, UNIV. OF WIS. PAUL P. CARBONE COMPREHENSIVE 
CANCER CTR., ACHIEVING BALANCE IN FEDERAL AND STATE PAIN POLICY: A GUIDE TO EVALUATION, 
at SECTION III: BACKGROUND ABOUT PAIN RELIEF AND PUBLIC POLICY- STATE POLICIES ARE 
CHANGING, Fig.1 (2007), available at www.painpolicy.wisc.edu/Achieving_Balance/ 
EG2007.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) (illustrating the increasing number of state pain-
specific policies); see also FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF THE U.S., MODEL POLICY FOR THE USE 
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PAIN, at INTRODUCTION n.1 (2004), 
available at www.fsmb.org/pdf/2004_grpol_Controlled_Substances.pdf (last visited July 23, 
2008) (“As of January 2004, 22 of 70 state medical boards have policy, rules, regulations or 
statutes reflecting the Federation’s Model Guidelines for the Use of Controlled Substances for 
the Treatment of Pain and two (2) states have formally endorsed the Model Guidelines.”). 
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and developed guidelines for their use,286 it was also a decade in which 
great public attention was brought to bear on the fact that pain, both 
cancer-related and non-malignant chronic pain, was being woefully 
undertreated in the United States.287  Between 1999 and 2004, in line with 
the “sea change” in attitudes toward pain treatment, two state medical 
boards disciplined physicians for failure to adequately prescribe pain 
medication for their patients.288  On the heels of the second disciplinary 
action, in 2004, the FSMB provided physicians with an additional incentive 
to adequately treat pain by updating its Guidelines and issuing a Model 
Policy for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain.289  The 
new policy went “beyond attempting to reassure physicians that they [would] 
not be sanctioned for prescribing large doses of pain medication if 
 
 286. See, e.g., Sheldon L. Burchman & Paul S. Pagel, Implementation of a Formal 
Treatment Agreement for Outpatient Management of Chronic Nonmalignant Pain with Opioid 
Analgesics, 10 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 556, 557, 561 nn.4-14 (1995) (listing studies from 
1982-1992 that recommended various approaches to treating chronic nonmalignant pain 
with opioids). 
 287. See, e.g., Charles S. Cleeland, Editorial, Undertreatment of Cancer Pain in Elderly 
Patients, 279 JAMA 1914, 1915 (1998) (“Ample evidence indicates that patients, their 
families, and the public are becoming less tolerant of poor pain management.”); Sullum, 
supra note 104, at 23. 
 288. See Sandy Kleffman, Doctor Disciplined over Pain Treatment, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, 
Jan. 17, 2004, at A3 [hereinafter Kleffman, Doctor Disciplined over Pain Treatment].  In 1999, 
the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners disciplined Dr. Paul Bilder for failure to prescribe 
adequate pain relief medication.  Ellen Goodman, Op-Ed., From Oregon, a Call for 
Compassionate Care, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1999, at A19.  Bilder was cited for several 
infractions including prescribing only Tylenol for a terminally ill cancer patient’s pain and 
prescribing insufficient pain medication for a hospice patient.  Id.  The Board ordered Bilder to 
complete an educational program on pain treatment and on physician-patient communication 
and to undergo a mental health examination.  S. Van McCrary, Discipline of Oregon 
Physician for Undertreating Pain Is an Appropriate Response to a Serious Problem, HEALTH L. 
PERSP., Sept. 21, 1999, at www.law.uh.edu/Healthlaw/perspectives/Bioethics/990921 
Discipline.html (last visited July 23, 2008).  In March 2003, the Medical Board of California 
filed a complaint against Dr. Eugene Whitney for failure to adequately treat the pain of Lester 
Tomlinson, a terminally ill lung cancer patient.  Sandy Kleffman, Suit Filed over Pain Treatment 
of Ill Man, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at A1.  In January 2004, Dr. Whitney 
accepted a public reprimand from the Medical Board, and he was required to complete a 
forty-hour pain management course, undergo a physical and mental health assessment and a 
clinical and communication skills assessment.  Kleffman, Doctor Disciplined over Pain 
Treatment, supra. 
 289. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF THE U.S., supra note 285; see also Diane E. Hoffmann, 
The Use of Opioid Analgesics: Legal and Regulatory Issues, in COMPLICATIONS IN REGIONAL 
ANESTHESIA & PAIN MEDICINE 353, 354 Box 34-1, 355 (Joseph M. Neal & James P. Rathmell 
eds., 2007) (discussing the key elements of the FSMB 2004 update to the Model Guidelines). 
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appropriate” and sent “a message that undertreatment of pain [could] be 
considered substandard care.”290 
These actions by medical specialty groups and state medical boards 
came together to encourage physicians to more appropriately and more 
aggressively treat their patients’ pain.  As a result, many physicians began to 
prescribe opioids in much larger doses than they had in the past.291 
 Many pain experts now assert that there is no upper limit of safety for 
opioid dosages.  They believe that “[a]s long as the dose is [started] low and 
increased gradually, large doses [may] be taken [and are] limited only by 
adverse [side] effects.”292  Unlike non-opioid analgesics, opioids do not 
cause damage to major organs.293  The correct amount, they argue, is what 
reduces or eliminates the patient’s pain without unacceptable side effects.294  
Side effects can include “sedation, respiratory depression, nausea, vomiting, 
itching, urinary retention, and constipation.”295  Often patients develop a 
tolerance relatively quickly to sedation, respiratory depression, nausea, and 
vomiting so that they do not experience these negative effects.296 
 Despite this view that many pain treatment experts have regarding the 
use of opioids for the treatment of pain, others, including many at the DEA, 
believe that “there is a difference of opinion [in] the medical profession 
regarding the use of opioids in the management of chronic pain, with two 
differing approaches classified as the therapeutic school . . . and the 
dependency school.”297  Those in the therapeutic school believe that “the 
measure of successful treatment of a chronic pain patient is whether the 
patient has experienced an increase in his/her level of comfort and function 
 
 290. Hoffmann, supra note 289, at 355. 
 291. During the past decade, medical prescribing practices regarding chronic pain 
diagnoses in this country have undergone dramatic change.  More physicians are prescribing 
Schedule II narcotics to a larger number of patients, and the dosages prescribed to these 
patients have increased markedly.  See, e.g., Joan Arehart-Treichel, Opioid Prescribing May 
Be Increasing, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Apr. 20, 2007, at 38; Bridget M. Kuehn, Opioid 
Prescriptions Soar: Increase in Legitimate Use as Well as Abuse, 297 JAMA 249, 251 (2007). 
 292. Jennifer P. Schneider, Rational Use of Opioid Analgesics in Chronic Musculoskeletal 
Pain, 23 J. MUSCULOSKELETAL MED. 145, 146 (2006); see also CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra 
note 277, at 2 (stating that “for most opioids, there does not appear to be an arbitrary upper 
dosage limit, as was previously thought”). 
 293. See Schneider, supra note 292, at 146 (“Unlike acetaminophen, aspirin, and many 
other drugs, opioid analgesics do not have any specific organ toxicity.”). 
 294. Id. at 146. 
 295. Hussam Antoin & Ralph D. Beasley, Opioids for Chronic Noncancer Pain: Tailoring 
Therapy to Fit the Patient and the Pain, 116 POSTGRADUATE MED. 37, 38 (2006). 
 296. See id. 
 297. Paul W. Saxton, Continuation of Registration, 64 Fed. Reg. 25,073, 25,074 (Drug 
Enforcement Admin. May 10, 1999). 
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and has an improved quality of life.”298  They assert that the number of pills 
consumed is not the appropriate measure and that a physician has to trust 
the patient’s reporting of pain and individualize his or her treatment.299  
Those in the dependency school believe that there is a significant risk of 
drug addiction in the long-term use of high doses of opioids; therefore, it is 
not appropriate to prescribe in this manner.300 
Law enforcement officials appear to believe that patients complaining of 
pain who need large volumes of medication often are either addicts or 
diverters and, therefore, prescribing to them is not a legitimate medical 
purpose.301  The definition of “addict” in the Controlled Substances Act 
includes “any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to 
endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare.”302  Experts argue 
that equating chronic pain patients with addicts “ignores the medical fact” 
that a very small percentage “of chronic pain patients are addicted and 
represent[] no threat to public safety and morality.”303  Moreover, this 
definition ignores the possibility that some addicts are in physical pain (other 
than that caused by withdrawal) and need medication to treat their pain. 
 The debate, in large part, appears to turn on the actual risk of opioid 
addiction.  As long as doctors have administered narcotics, they have been 
worried about their patients becoming addicted to the drugs.  Their worries 
were often due to a misunderstanding of the differences between addiction, 
tolerance, and dependence.304  Tolerance results when exposure to a drug 
leads to a reduction in one or more of the drug’s intended effects over time 
so that an increased dose may be required to maintain the same 
physiological effects.305  Physical dependence is a condition manifested by 
withdrawal symptoms when a drug is abruptly terminated or reduced in 
dose.306  Addiction, in contrast, is a condition resulting in “impaired control 
 
 298. Id. at 25,074-75. 
 299. See id. at 25,075. 
 300. See id. at 20,074 (stating that physicians “should start with the most benign 
medications at the least dose and increase the dose or change the medication as needed . . . 
[because] increasing dosage levels may not be appropriate if the pain is not responding to the 
opioids” ). 
 301. Ronald T. Libby, The DEA’s OxyContin Action Plan: An Unproven Drug Epidemic, PAIN 
RELIEF NETWORK, Dec. 16, 2003, at www.painreliefnetwork.org/prn/the-deas-oxycontin-action-
plan-an-unproven-drug-epidemic.php (last visited July 23, 2008). 
 302. 21 U.S.C. § 802(1) (2000). 
 303. Libby, supra note 301. 
 304. AM. ACAD. OF PAIN MED., AM. PAIN SOC’Y & AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., 
DEFINITIONS RELATED TO THE USE OF OPIOIDS FOR THE TREATMENT OF PAIN 1 (2001), available at 
www.painmed.org/pdf/definition.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008) [hereinafter DEFINITIONS 
RELATED TO THE USE OF OPIOIDS FOR THE TREATMENT OF PAIN]. 
 305. Id. at 3. 
 306. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
272 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:231 
over drug use, compulsive use, continued use despite harm, and 
craving.”307 
While most individuals receiving opioid therapy do develop physical 
dependence,308 a number of studies have confirmed that 
patients treated with narcotics rarely become addicts.  In 1980 researchers 
at Boston University Medical Center reported that they had reviewed the 
records of 11,882 hospital patients treated with narcotics and found “only 
four cases of reasonably well documented addiction in patients who had no 
history of addiction.”  A 1982 study of 10,000 burn victims who had 
received narcotic injections, most of them for weeks or months, found no 
cases of drug abuse that could be attributed to pain treatment.  In a 1986 
study of 38 chronic pain patients who were treated with opioids for years, 
only two became addicted, and both had histories of drug abuse.309 
A 1993 article in a newsletter issued by the National Institute on Drug Abuse 
stated that opioids “are rarely abused when used for medical purposes.”310 
The 1996 Consensus Statement from the American Academy of Pain 
Medicine and the American Pain Society asserts that “[m]isunderstanding of 
addiction and mislabeling of patients as addicts result in unnecessary 
withholding of opioid medications” and notes that “[s]tudies indicate that the 
de novo development of addiction when opioids are used for the relief of 
pain is low.”311  Moreover, the two professional societies agree “that known 
addicts can benefit from the carefully supervised, judicious use of opioids for 
the treatment of pain due to cancer, surgery, or recurrent painful illnesses 
such as sickle cell disease.”312 
While the large majority of medical experts agree that most pain patients 
can successfully use narcotics without negative consequences, some 
acknowledge that a good deal “remains unknown about the number or 
types of chronic pain sufferers who will become addicted as a result of 
medical care, or ‘iatrogenically’ addicted.”313 According to one article, “the 
 
 307. Id. 
 308. See id. at 3. 
 309. Sullum, supra note 104, at 24. 
 310. See id. at 25 (quoting a 1993 newsletter article from the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, National Institutes of Health). 
 311. CONSENSUS STATEMENT, supra note 277, at 2. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Barry Meier, The Delicate Balance of Pain and Addiction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2003, 
at F1; see also Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. 
52,716, 52,718 n.20 (Sept. 6, 2006) (“Further controlled trials [should] be conducted on 
opioid therapy in patients with chronic noncancer pain in an effort to identify best practice with 
regard to selection of both medication and treatment regimens [to] identify patient 
characteristics that predict opioid responsiveness [and to] provide support for guidelines on 
appropriate precautions, contraindications, and the degree of monitoring required in such 
patients.”) (quoting AM. MED. ASS’N, DIRECTIVES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES: D-120.999 
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biggest risk appears to be to patients who have abused drugs or to those 
who have an underlying, undiagnosed vulnerability to abuse substances, a 
condition that may affect an estimated 3 to 14 percent of the 
population.”314  There is also uncertainty about the best way to treat 
substance abusers who are also afflicted with chronic pain.315 
In the midst of the debate over the addictive potential of long-term and 
high doses of opioids, a renewed concern about drug diversion, in light of 
the availability and abuse associated with OxyContin, appeared in the late 
90s and has continued through the present.316  OxyContin “is a 12-hour, 
timed-release form of oxycodone, a synthetic opioid that has long been 
available in products such as Percocet, Percodan, and Tylox.”317  By the 
early 2000s, the drug had become the most prescribed Schedule II narcotic 
in the country.318  As the DEA and state drug enforcement officials found 
evidence of diversion of the drug from legitimate users to addicts, they 
began to scrutinize physicians and pharmacists who prescribed and 
dispensed large doses of the drug.319  They were able to link OxyContin to a 
number of overdose deaths, pharmacy robberies, and other criminal 
activities.320 
 
USE OF OPIOIDS IN CHRONIC NONCANCER PAIN) (alterations in original); Jane C. Ballantyne & 
Jianren Mao, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Pain, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1943, 1948 fig.2, 
1951 (2003) (stating that “it is widely acknowledged that there is a link between previous drug 
or alcohol abuse and addiction to opioids prescribed for pain”). 
 314. Meier, supra note 313; see also Antoin & Beasley, supra note 295, at 39 (citing 
Savage who used “population studies to estimate the risk of addiction at 3% to 16% in the 
general population” and suggesting that currently a “10% incidence of addiction is probably 
the best estimate to discuss with patients when initiating opioid treatment”). 
 315. See Meier, supra note 313. 
 316. Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in Oversight of 
Physician Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
21, 21 (2003). 
 317. Ammann, supra note 198, at 30. 
 318. Id.; U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., PUB’N NO. DEA-02017, DRUG INTELLIGENCE 
BRIEF, OXYCONTIN: PHARMACEUTICAL DIVERSION, at BACKGROUND (2002), available at 
www.avitarinc.com/pdf/Drug-Intelligence-Brief-Oxycotine-Facts.pdf (last visited July 23, 
2008). 
 319. See U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 318, at DIVERSION AND 
DISTRIBUTION. 
 320. See id.  “From 1996 to 1999, the number of drug abuse deaths reported to [the 
Drug Abuse Warning Network] that involved oxycodone more than quadrupled, with 268 
deaths in 1999 compared to 51 in 1996.” Id. at BACKGROUND. 
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VI.  THE LEGAL BASIS FOR ARREST AND PROSECUTION OF PHYSICIANS FOR OPIOID 
PRESCRIBING 
In the large majority of cases involving physicians who are arrested for 
violation of the controlled substance laws but who are arguably treating 
pain patients, the charges are based on distributing or dispensing controlled 
substances (generally opioids) in violation of section 841(a) of the CSA321 or 
similar state law provisions.322  These charges require that the government 
“prove: (1) ‘that the [physician] distributed . . . a controlled substance’; (2) 
that the [physician] ‘acted knowingly and intentionally’; and (3) ‘that the 
[physician’s] actions were not for legitimate medical purposes in the usual 
course of his professional medical practice or were beyond the bounds of 
medical practice.’”323 
It is the last element that has proved most difficult and problematic for 
the courts, which have struggled with the concept.324  Neither the CSA nor 
its implementing regulations define “legitimate medical purpose”; nor do 
they set standards as to what constitutes “the usual course of professional 
practice.”325  The two phrases were discussed at some length in United 
States v. Moore,326 one of the first cases involving interpretation of the CSA 
 
 321. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000). 
 322. The state laws are typically based on the Uniform Controlled Substances Act drafted 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  UNIFORM CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES ACT (1994), available at www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ 
ucsa94.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008).  The Uniform Act has been adopted by every state but 
New Hampshire and Vermont.  See Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of 
Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,716, 52,717 n.12 (Sept. 6, 2006). 
 323. United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 475 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. 
Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1187 (4th Cir. 1995)); see United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 689-
90 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1141 (4th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Daniel, 3 F.3d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1993); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 
(2007) (describing the purpose of issuing prescriptions); Dispensing Controlled Substances for 
the Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. at 52,717 (describing state law requirements). 
 324. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975); United States v. 
Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1975) (Ely, J. dissenting) (“[I]t is difficult to see how 
the language can be made more precise and at the same time ban the undesirable conduct 
on the part of physicians which Congress intended to make illegal and subject to sanctions.”); 
United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1973) (“‘[w]hat constitutes bona fide 
medical practice must be determined upon consideration of evidence and attending 
circumstances.’”) (quoting Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (alteration in 
original)).  For a discussion of this struggle, see infra notes 426-435 and accompanying text. 
 325. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(1) (2000) (outlining congressional findings, which include that 
many controlled substances have a legitimate medical purpose); see also Houck, supra note 
284, at 11 (“The usual course of professional practice arguably involves such factors as the 
practitioner’s medical specialty, his or her professional training and applicable practice 
guidelines.”). 
 326. 423 U.S. 122. 
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by the U.S. Supreme Court.  At issue in the case was, first, whether 
registrants under the CSA were exempt from prosecution under section 
841(a)(1) and could only be prosecuted under sections 842 and 843, which 
imposed significantly less harsh penalties;327 and, second, if physicians 
could be prosecuted under Sec. 841, whether Moore’s conduct was 
authorized by the Act.328  Moore, a physician, was convicted of “knowing 
and unlawful distribution and dispensation of methadone . . . in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1).”329  Evidence presented at trial indicated that Moore 
had “prescribed large quantities of methadone” for patients with “only the 
most perfunctory [physical] examination” and minimal instructions.330  He 
charged fees based on “the quantity [of methadone] prescribed, rather than 
[on] the medical services performed.”331  Moore argued that he was using 
an innovative protocol in an attempt to treat narcotic addiction332 and that, 
by and large, his patients came off heroin as a result of his “treatment.”333  
The Court was required to ascertain whether his acts constituted behavior 
“outside the usual course of professional practice.”334  In making that 
determination, the Court referred to Congress’ passage of the Narcotic 
Addict Treatment Act of 1974 (NATA).335  The Court noted that when 
Congress passed NATA, “it sought to ‘cure’” the difficulty in prosecuting 
physicians under the CSA “‘because of the intricate and nearly impossible 
burden of establishing what is beyond “the course of professional practice” 
for criminal law purposes when such a practitioner speciously claims that the 
practices in question were ethical and humanitarian in nature.’”336  NATA 
 
 327. Early cases interpreting the CSA debated whether the severe criminal sanctions of 
section 841 applied to physician registrants or whether Congress intended that registrant 
violations be dealt with through professional or administrative action and subject to “less-
severe criminal and civil sanctions provided in sections 842 and 843” of the Act.  Rosenberg, 
515 F.2d at 203.  The issue was resolved in Moore, 423 U.S. at 124, which held “that 
registered physicians can be prosecuted under § 841 when their activities fall outside the usual 
course of professional practice.” 
 328. Moore, 423 U.S. at 124, 131. 
 329. Id. at 124. 
 330. Id. at 126-27. 
 331. Id. at 126. 
 332. Sentencing Transcript at 129, United States v. Moore, Crim. No. 1350-72 (1975) 
(stating that the protocol “involved a saturation to a point of blockade, in which the euphoria 
formerly obtained was no longer obtained from heroin and an incentive to become completely 
drug-free”); see also Moore, 423 U.S. at 126 (stating that Moore’s “defense at trial was that 
he had devised a new method of detoxification based on the work of a British practitioner”). 
 333. Sentencing Transcript at 130, Moore, Crim. No. 1350-72. 
 334. Moore, 423 U.S. at 124, 139. 
 335. Id. at 139 n.16; Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-281, 88 
Stat. 124. 
 336. Moore, 423 U.S. at 139 n.16 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-192, at 14 (1973)). 
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apparently did this by setting up a separate set of explicit requirements that 
a practitioner must meet in order to dispense narcotic drugs for 
maintenance or detoxification treatment for addicts.337  While the new law 
helped clarify what constituted “legitimate medical practice” when treating 
addicts, the phrase remains undefined outside of that context. 
Another contentious issue in prosecuting these cases arises in 
establishing the mens rea necessary to convict under section 841.  Courts 
have apparently agreed that the knowledge requirement applies to the third 
element of the crime, i.e., that the prosecution must prove that the physician 
knowingly or intentionally prescribed outside the usual course of 
professional practice or not for a legitimate medical purpose.338  Because 
determining what the physician actually knew or intended is difficult, “courts 
have held that a deliberate course of conduct whereby the defendant avoids 
the requisite guilty knowledge may be held tantamount to guilty knowledge 
per se.”339  In these cases, the trial court may issue to the jury a “conscious 
avoidance” charge, also known as a “willful blindness” instruction.340  In the 
context of illegal drug distribution, the instructions have been used primarily 
for cases where the defendant is accused of transporting drugs and claims 
not to have been aware that he was carrying the drugs, e.g., did not know 
the contents of the suitcase he was asked to carry.341  But, the instructions 
have also been used in cases against physicians prescribing drugs to 
patients who subsequently diverted them with the prosecution arguing that 
 
 337. See OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 266, at 23; see also supra note 266 
and accompanying text. 
 338. See, e.g., United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We 
agree with Dr. Feingold’s contention that a practitioner who acts outside the usual course of 
professional practice may be convicted under § 841(a) only if he does so intentionally. . . . 
Simply put, to convict a practitioner under § 841(a), the government must prove . . . that the 
practitioner acted with intent to distribute the drugs and with intent to distribute them outside 
the course of professional practice.  In other words, the jury must make a finding of intent not 
merely with respect to distribution, but also with respect to the doctor’s intent to act as a 
pusher rather than a medical professional.”). 
 339. Deborah Sprenger, Annotation, Propriety of Instruction of Jury on “Conscious 
Avoidance” of Knowledge of Nature of Substance or Transaction in Prosecution for Possession 
or Distribution of Drugs, 109 A.L.R. FED. 710, 713, § 2[a] (1992). 
 340. See id.  The charge has also been referred to as “an ostrich instruction, because the 
defendant is considered by the court to have, figuratively, stuck his head in the sand to avoid 
learning truths that would otherwise have been patently obvious to the average reasonable 
person.”  Id.  See also JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 
100-01 (1st ed. 2001) (discussing the willful blindness jury instruction). 
 341. See Sprenger, supra note 339, at 714, § 2. 
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the physician deliberately ignored facts that would have led one to believe 
the patient was diverting the drugs.342 
Defendants have been assisted, to some extent, by the fact that virtually 
all courts hearing these cases have accepted a good faith defense to the 
charges.343  Thus, physicians have been able to argue that they prescribed 
in good faith, i.e., with the honest belief that they were doing so to treat a 
patient’s pain.344  While the good faith defense may appear helpful to 
 
 342. See, e.g., United States v. Katz, 445 F.3d 1023, 1031 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A willful 
blindness instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack of guilty knowledge, but 
the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.  Ignorance is deliberate if the 
defendant was presented with facts that put her on notice that criminal activity was particularly 
likely and yet she intentionally failed to investigate those facts.”) (quoting United States v. 
Florez, 368 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004)); Transcript of Record at 1221, United States v. 
McIver, 470 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-4884) (jury instructions stating, “[t]he 
government may prove the defendant acted knowingly by proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that this defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to 
him.  No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by deliberately ignoring what is obvious”). 
 343. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975); McIver, 470 F.3d 550; 
United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2006); Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001; United 
States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by United 
States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 689-
90 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1187 (4th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132, 1141 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hughes, 
895 F.2d 1135 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Carroll, 518 F.2d 
187 (6th Cir. 1975). 
 344. For example, the federal pattern jury instruction for the good faith defense states: 
In order to sustain its burden of proof . . . the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and deliberately [distributed] 
[dispensed] . . . a controlled substance and did so other than in good faith in the usual 
course of a professional practice and in accordance with a standard of medical 
practice generally recognized and accepted in the United States.  The defendant may 
not be convicted if [he] [she] merely made an honest effort to treat [his] [her] patients in 
compliance with an accepted standard of medical practice. 
A controlled substance is [distributed] [dispensed] . . . by a [physician] [pharmacist] in 
the usual course of [his] [her] professional practice and, therefore, lawfully, if the 
substance is [distributed] [dispensed] . . . by [him] [her] in good faith in medically 
treating a patient.  Good faith in this context means good intentions and the honest 
exercise of good professional judgment as to a patient's medical needs.  Good faith 
connotes an observance of conduct in accordance with what the [physician] 
[pharmacist] should reasonably believe to be proper medical practice. 
In determining whether or not Defendant _____ acted in good faith in the course of a 
medical practice, you may consider all of the evidence in the case which relates to that 
conduct. 
Unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct charged in Count _____ 
of the indictment was not done in good faith in the course of a medical practice you 
must acquit Defendant _____ of that charge. 
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physicians, the courts have, to some extent, undercut its effectiveness by 
concluding that the good faith test must be an objective, not a subjective 
test.345  Such an objective test has allowed prosecutors to bring in evidence 
of “red flags,” i.e., indications that a reasonable physician would have 
known that his prescribing was not for a legitimate medical purpose.346 
Physicians who are targeted by the DEA and their state-enforcement 
counterparts find it very difficult to defend against the alleged charges.  In 
these cases, the physicians are often charged with hundreds of counts of 
criminal wrongdoing.347  The large numbers are somewhat misleading in 
that “ordinary events in a doctor’s office become criminal when the doctor 
steps outside the bounds of legitimate medicine.”348  As a result, each time 
a physician writes a new prescription for a controlled substance it can be a 
separate crime.349  The same act can be considered healthcare fraud if the 
prescribing is not medically necessary and a third party payer is billed for the 
drugs.350  Moreover, if the prescription is sent through the mail, the 
physician can be guilty of mail fraud.351  In addition, 
[s]eeing a patient who turns out to be a drug dealer or addict can lead to a 
conspiracy count, as can working with one’s colleagues. . . . [Moreover], 
any death that can in any way be connected to use of the doctor’s 
prescriptions becomes a charge of drug dispensing resulting in death or 
serious injury—even if the person who died stole the drug from a legitimate 
patient, lied to get the drug, used it with other drugs or alcohol, or expired 
while suffering from a potentially fatal illness.352 
In many of these cases, prosecutors use conspiracy and racketeering 
charges to expand the reach of the underlying charges and bring more 
evidence into the case.353  Practically, conspiracy charges allow the 
 
KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 64.16 at 428-29 (5th ed. 
2000) (alterations in original). 
 345. See Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 480 (“‘Every court to examine the issue has held that the 
objective standard that the doctor acted in accordance with what he reasonably believed to be 
proper medical practice should apply.’”) (quoting 3 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Instruction 56-19, cmt. (2003)). 
 346. See John Tierney, Trafficker or Healer? And Who’s the Victim?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
2007, at F1 (discussing the use of “red flags” in the prosecution of Dr. William Hurwitz). 
 347. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 6 (stating that Dr. Jeri Hassman was “charged with 
362 counts of prescribing controlled drugs outside the normal practice of medicine”). 
 348. Szalavitz, supra note 61, at 35. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. In general, conspiracy statutes, because of their broad reach, have been described 
“as the ‘darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.’”  O’SULLIVAN, supra note 340, at 564 
(quoting Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) (Learned Hand, J.)). 
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prosecution to admit statements by co-conspirators into evidence that would 
otherwise be considered hearsay.354  In these cases, patient informants are 
the co-conspirators.  Their “statements, if believed, can be very damaging to 
the defense because they often constitute the only direct evidence regarding 
such central issues as the defendant’s knowledge or intent.”355  Under the 
CSA, there is a specific provision outlawing attempt or conspiracy to commit 
another offense in the Act.356  While most federal conspiracy statutes require 
“(1) the existence of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) the 
defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy; and (3) 
the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,”357 the CSA 
does not require proof of an overt act for conviction.358  Thus, proving the 
elements of conspiracy under the CSA is significantly easier than under most 
other federal statutes.  In addition, the “knowledge requirement” can be 
satisfied “by showing either that [the defendant] actually knew of the 
conspiracy . . . or that he was willfully blind to it by ‘purposely clos[ing] his 
eyes to avoid knowing what was taking place around him.’”359 
Federal prosecutors also routinely bring racketeering charges in these 
cases under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
statute.360  Using the RICO statute often is controversial, as it is regularly 
applied to conduct that is far outside the original purpose of the Act, i.e., to 
eradicate organized crime.361  Prosecutors frequently attempt to invoke 
RICO outside the organized crime context because of the increased 
 
 354. Id. (discussing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)). 
 355. Id. 
 356. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). 
 357. United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 358. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. 
 359. United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 563 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. 
Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 360. See, e.g., Nair, Dr. Knox Pleads Guilty, Surrenders License, supra note 84 (describing 
case against Dr. Cecil Knox, who faced ninety-five charges, among them racketeering and 
conspiracy to commit racketeering); see also News Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of 
Va., Dr. Cecil Knox Surrenders Medical License and DEA Registration Number; Sentenced to 
Five Years Probation (Jan. 20, 2006), at www.usdoj.gov/usao/vaw/press_releases/ 
knox_20jan2006.html (last visited July 23, 2008) (“Knox . . . admitted to owning and 
operating a criminal enterprise in Roanoke called Southwest Virginia Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation, PC.  The criminal enterprise and Dr. Knox made money by billing Medicare, 
Medicaid, and insurance companies for medical services purportedly performed by Dr. Knox.  
Beginning in 1997 and continuing through 2002, Dr. Knox unlawfully participated in the 
conduct of the affairs of that criminal enterprise and conducted a pattern of racketeering 
activities in an effort to gain monetary profit.”). 
 361. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 661, 750 (1987) (“[B]y far the greater number of RICO indictments in the white collar 
area have no connection whatever to organized crime.”). 
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sanctions and remedies it allows.362  For example, it provides not only 
traditional criminal penalties, but also criminal forfeiture, i.e., forfeiture of all 
assets acquired in connection with the criminal enterprise.363 
In addition to conspiracy and racketeering charges and charges based 
on violation of the CSA or its state counterparts, physicians prescribing 
opioids are often charged with healthcare fraud.  These charges are 
typically based on allegations that the drugs prescribed by the physician 
were not “medically necessary” and, thus, were prescribed in violation of 
federal Medicare and federal/state Medicaid laws.364  The government may 
also bring a number of federal and state false claims actions.365  Although 
prosecutions based on alleged false claims in this area have rarely been 
successful, the charges are often brought forward in the initial stages of 
prosecution in an effort to force settlement or bolster the government’s 
claims of unlawful prescribing.366 
VII.  DEA ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 
The recent arrests and prosecutions of physicians described in this paper 
have coincided with a series of “campaigns” initiated by the DEA to pursue 
physicians prescribing opioids.  In 2001, the DEA announced a new anti-
drug campaign that it called the OxyContin Action Plan.367  DEA 
Administrator Asa Hutchinson testified that the initiative was necessary to 
combat what has been called “a deadly drug epidemic spreading 
throughout rural America” and that the DEA would reallocate its resources 
to address this threat.368  The DEA targeted doctors, pharmacists, and 
dentists in this crackdown on illegal prescription diversion.369 
 
 362. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000) (describing the criminal penalties for violating the 
statute to include fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture of assets acquired in connection with the 
criminal enterprise). 
 363. See id. 
 364. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(a) (2000). 
 365. See Hoffmann, supra note 289, at 359 (noting that in a number of cases the 
government has charged physicians with fraud and abuse law violations for allegedly 
prescribing medications that were not “medically necessary”). 
 366. See id. at 358-59 (“To be successful in a false claims action, the government must 
prove that the defendant submitted a claim to the government for payment, that the defendant 
had knowledge that the claim was false or fraudulent, and that the claim was in fact false or 
fraudulent.”). 
 367. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 10; Libby, supra note 301.  The initiative 
was partly in response to a G.A.O. report that was highly critical of the DEA’s failure to 
combat prescription drug abuse.  See id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, REP. NO. 
GAO/GGD-99-108, DRUG CONTROL: DEA’S STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONS IN THE 1990S 
(1999)). 
 368. Libby, supra note 301. In a news briefing, Libby contended that the DEA referral to an 
OxyContin “epidemic” is unfounded.  He stated that the DEA had based this statement on 
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In 2003, the DEA requested $24.6 million and 133 new positions to 
strengthen and improve its diversion control efforts.370  In addition, the 
Agency developed a “National Action Plan” that targets “key sources of 
OxyContin and other opioids, including medical professionals it considers 
unscrupulous.”371  In March 2004, the Bush Administration announced “a 
coordinated drug strategy to confront the illegal diversion and abuse of 
prescription drugs.”372  
 While the DEA was ramping up its enforcement efforts, it came under 
intense criticism by physician groups for the chilling effects of its high profile 
arrests and prosecutions of physicians.373  As a result, in August 2004 after 
extensive consultation with the Federation of State Medical Boards and other 
groups, the DEA published on its Web site a set of guidelines “providing 
‘some clarifications about what does or does not constitute questionable 
[prescribing] activity in the eyes of the DEA.’”374  The guidelines, in the form 
of “Prescription Pain Medications: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers 
for Health Care Professionals and Law Enforcement Personnel” (FAQs) 
provided physicians with advice on how to identify a person who is likely to 
 
figures of OxyContin-related deaths, many of which were not caused by OxyContin or 
OxyContin alone, but by a combination of OxyContin and other drugs. Id.; see also Hearing 
Before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics, 107th Cong. (2002), available at 
www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct041102p.html (last visited July 23, 2008) (statement of 
Asa Hutchinson, Adm’r, Drug Enforcement Admin.). 
 369. See Libby, supra note 301. 
 370. Ammann, supra note 198, at 33. 
 371. Id.  At about the same time, federal agencies began to investigate Purdue Pharma, 
the manufacturer of OxyContin.  See Barry Meier, 3 Officials Are Sentenced In Case Involving 
OxyContin, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, at C4.  The investigation ultimately ended in May 
2007 with a plea agreement between Purdue Frederick, a holding company affiliated with 
Purdue Pharma, and three of Purdue Pharma’s top executives and the U.S. Attorney’s Office.  
Id.  The company “pleaded guilty to a felony charge that it had fraudulently claimed to doctors 
and patients that OxyContin would cause less abuse and addiction than competing short-
acting narcotics” and agreed to pay $600 million in fines.  Id.  The executives “pleaded guilty 
to misdemeanor charges of misbranding,” paid $34.5 million in fines, and were later 
sentenced to “three years of probation and . . . 400 hours of service in a drug abuse or drug 
treatment program.” Id. 
 372. Press Release, Office of Nat’l Drug Control Pol’y, U.S. Drug Prevention, Treatment, 
Enforcement Agencies Take on “Doctor Shoppers,” “Pill Mills” (Mar. 1, 2004), at 
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press04/030104.html (last visited July 23, 2008). 
 373. See Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 316, at 22. 
 374. American Cancer Society, New Guidance Issued for Opioid Pain Medication, 54 CA 
CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 288, 288 (2004) (quoting Patricia Good of the DEA’s Office of 
Diversion Control); see Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 69 
Fed. Reg. 67,170, 67,170 (Nov. 16, 2004). 
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abuse or divert drugs for criminal distribution.375  While pain treatment 
advocates applauded the DEA for its efforts to clarify the bases for its arrests 
of physicians for opioid prescribing, in October 2004 the DEA withdrew the 
FAQs, stating that they included some “misstatements.”376 
On November 16, 2004, DEA published an Interim Policy Statement 
(IPS) which, it said, corrected some of the misstatements of the earlier 
document.377  The pain treatment community and others reacted to the 
withdrawal of the FAQs and subsequent IPS with surprise and criticism.  In 
response to the DEA actions, thirty attorneys general wrote a letter to DEA 
Administrator Karen Tandy arguing that “the agency was not properly 
balancing the need for stopping drug diversion with the need to treat 
legitimate pain.”378  And, David Joranson, Director of the Pain & Policy 
Studies Group at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Medical School, 
wrote a letter to the Deputy Administrator of the DEA’s Office of Diversion 
Control, asserting that “the IPS misrepresented the FAQ[s] and made 
suggestions that are likely to interfere in medical practice and pain 
management, while contributing little if anything to addressing prescription 
drug abuse and illegal activities that result in diversion.”379  Furthermore, 
Joranson stated that in the IPS, “[s]ome interpretations of law governing 
prescribing and dispensing contradict DEA’s own earlier official statements 
and have already started to cause confusion and concern among pain 
practitioners.”380  In particular, Joranson complained that the IPS did not 
acknowledge “that it is within the scope of federal law to prescribe opioids 
for the purpose of treating pain in patients with addictive disease or a history 
of substance abuse” while the FAQ did.381 
In response to these complaints, on January 18, 2005, the DEA issued a 
statement in the Federal Register that it was soliciting comments from 
 
 375. See Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
67,170. 
 376. See id.  While this reason was the official statement regarding the retraction of the 
FAQs, there is some evidence that they were withdrawn because the defense in the Hurwitz 
trial attempted to use them as evidence in his favor.  See Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 68. 
 377. Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,170 
(Nov. 16, 2004); Solicitation of Comments on Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the 
Treatment of Pain, 70 Fed. Reg. 2883 (Jan. 18, 2005). 
 378. Ralph Vartabedian, At Least 20 Years Await Convicted Doctor, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2005, at A14 (citing Letter from Thirty State Attorneys General, supra note 14). 
 379. Letter from David Joranson, Dir., Univ. of Wis. Pain & Policy Studies Group, to 
Michelle Leonhart, Deputy Adm’r, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Admin. 
(Nov. 24, 2004), available at www.painpolicy.wisc.edu/DEA/IPSresponse.pdf (last visited July 
23, 2008). 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id.  Joranson made the further point that “[s]ome individuals with addictive disease 
also have severe pain due to cancer and other diseases.”  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] TREATING PAIN V. REDUCING DRUG DIVERSION AND ABUSE 283 
physicians and other interested persons “as to what areas of the law relating 
to the dispensing of controlled substances for the treatment of pain they 
would like DEA to address” in a future Federal Register document.382  
Subsequently, in September 2006, DEA issued a comprehensive policy 
statement, responding to the comments it received and setting out “the 
pertinent principles” under the law “relating to the dispensing of controlled 
substances for the treatment of pain.”383  A significant focus of the statement 
was the extent to which prescription drugs are being abused in this 
country.384  The statement cited several recent studies documenting an 
increase in the abuse of prescription drugs, generally, and opioids for pain 
treatment, more specifically, over the past decade.385 
With this backdrop, the statement went on to describe the basis on 
which DEA acts to address illegal prescribing of pain medications.  The 
starting point for its discussion was the provision of law stating that any 
prescription of a controlled substance “must be issued for a legitimate 
medical purpose by a registered physician acting within the usual course of 
professional practice.”386  The statement summarizes the history of the 
standard, going back to its roots in the Harrison Narcotics Act, and asserts 
that the “requirement has been construed to mean that the prescription must 
be ‘in accordance with a standard of medical practice generally recognized 
and accepted in the United States’”387 but that “[f]ederal courts have long 
recognized that it is not possible to expand on the phrase ‘legitimate 
medical purpose in the usual course of professional practice,’ in a way that 
will provide definitive guidelines that address all the varied situations 
physicians might encounter.”388  The courts, the document states, generally 
have not had to define the circumstances more clearly because the facts 
 
 382. Solicitation of Comments on Dispensing of Controlled Substances for the Treatment 
of Pain, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2883. 
 383. Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,716, 
52,716 (Sept. 6, 2006). 
 384. See id. 
 385. See id. at 52,716 nn.1, 3-4 (citing NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NAT’L INSTS. OF 
HEALTH, RESEARCH REPORT SERIES: PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: ABUSE AND ADDICTION (2005), available 
at www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/RRPrescription.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008); OFFICE OF NAT’L 
DRUG CONTROL POLICY, 2006 SYNTHETIC DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: A FOCUS ON 
METHAMPHETAMINE AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE (2006), available at www.whitehousedrug 
policy.gov/publications/synthetic_drg_control_strat/synth_strat.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008); 
OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., THE NSDUH 
REPORT: NONMEDICAL USERS OF PAIN RELIEVERS: CHARACTERISTICS OF RECENT INITIATES (2006), 
available at www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k6/pain/pain.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008)). 
 386. Id. at 52,716. 
 387. Id. at 52,717 (quoting United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 139 (1975)). 
 388. Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. at 52,717. 
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were “not merely of questionable legality, but instead . . . a glaring example 
of illegal activity.”389 
In response to commenter requests for DEA to provide guidance to 
physicians as to practices that could get them into trouble, DEA echoed the 
sentiments of the courts, stating that “when it comes to prescribing 
controlled substances for pain” treatment, “one cannot provide an 
exhaustive and foolproof list of ‘do and don’ts.’”390  The Agency further 
stated that while it does not have the authority to educate physicians as to 
how to make “sound medical decisions in treating pain,” it “does have the 
authority and the expertise to investigate and determine whether a 
prescription for a controlled substance was issued for a legitimate medical 
purpose in the usual course of professional practice within the meaning of 
the CSA and DEA regulations.”391 
VIII.  ARGUMENTS FOR A CHANGE IN THE LAW AND PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICES 
In this section, I first present arguments as to why the current standard 
under the CSA is untenable and should be changed.  Second, I argue that, 
as a policy matter, DEA’s aggressive efforts to prosecute physicians 
prescribing opioids for chronic pain patients are doing more harm than 
good.  
A. An Inappropriate Standard 
In passing the CSA, Congress was seeking to control illegal distribution 
of controlled substances without interfering with legitimate medical 
practices.392  Individuals concerned with drug control policy and pain 
treatment have recognized the importance of these two goals and the need 
for balance393  in government policies and law enforcement actions so that 
efforts to prevent abuse and diversion of controlled substances do “not 
interfere with their essential uses for the relief of pain.”394 
At issue in many of the cases brought against physicians prescribing 
opioids is what constitutes “legitimate medical practice,” which is not 
defined in the law or regulations.395  While this definitional issue is often at 
the heart of the relevant court cases, the more significant question may be 
 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. at 52,719. 
 391. Id. at 52,719 n.21. 
 392. See Diane E. Hoffmann, Criminalizing the Prescribing of Opioids: Where Should We 
Draw the Line?, BIOETHICS F., Apr. 12, 2007, at www.bioethicsforum.org/treating-pain-
William-Hurwitz-Controlled-Substances-Act.asp (last visited July 23, 2008). 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. 
 395. See supra notes 321-337 and accompanying text. 
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whether the current standard for violation of the law, i.e., failure to prescribe 
within “the usual course of . . . professional practice” and “for a legitimate 
medical purpose,” is appropriate.396  Arguably, the standard draws the line 
too far on the side of prosecutions and does not adequately take into 
account the range of patients seen by physicians treating pain. 
On one end of the spectrum are patients who are truly in pain and may 
need and use significant volumes of pain medication.  They do not abuse or 
divert their medications. . . . On the other end are drug dealers who don’t 
even pretend to be patients.  They may strike a deal with the doctor—drugs 
for sex or money. . . . Bu[t], also along the continuum are individuals who 
come to the physician under false pretenses—individuals who pretend to be 
in pain but actually have no pain and plan to sell the drugs on the street.397 
Some of these patients may be good actors and it may not be possible 
for the well-meaning doctor to ferret out the good from the bad.  At this 
point in time, “[t]here is no objective test for pain.”398  Neither is there an 
easy test to determine whether the patient is telling the truth.  The 
determination of whether or not a patient is lying is a judgment call a 
physician must make by observing the patient’s behavior.399 
In response to prosecutor claims that doctors should know when 
individuals are feigning pain solely to obtain prescriptions for opioids, Drs. 
Jung and Reidenberg did a study to determine how readily physicians can 
tell when patients lie.400  They found that physicians correctly identified 
patients who were lying (pretending to be patients when they were not) only 
10% of the time.401  The authors attributed this result to an observation that 
doctors operate with a “truth bias,” i.e., they “assume that patients come to 
see them because they have a problem for which they want treatment.”402  
Given this bias, second guessing a physician’s judgment in these matters, 
after the fact, seems patently unfair.403 
 
 396. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2007) (stating that an effective prescription for a 
controlled substance “must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual 
practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice”). 
 397. See Hoffmann, supra note 392. 
 398. Id. 
 399. See id. 
 400. Beth Jung & Marcus M. Reidenberg, Physicians Being Deceived, 8 PAIN MED. 433 
(2007). 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. at 414. In contrast, the authors point out, that law enforcement personnel start 
with a different assumption – that people are not being truthful. Despite this, they reported on 
a study of police, judges, and federal law enforcement agents which found that “only Secret 
Service agents were better than chance at detecting lying.” Id. (citing P. Ekman & M. 
O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 913 (1991)). 
 403. See Hoffmann, supra note 392. 
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Additionally, physicians may see patients who are diverting or abusing 
narcotics but who are also legitimately in pain.  Arguably, prosecuting a 
physician who prescribes opioids to such patients is unfair if he or she is 
attempting to relieve the patient’s pain, even if the physician knows, based 
on past behavior, that the patient may abuse or divert the drugs.404  Despite 
the possibility for abuse or diversion, “in the absence of some kickback or 
tangible benefit . . . , or incontrovertible evidence that the doctor has simply 
exercised no medical judgment at all, it is difficult to justify criminal 
prosecution of a doctor for his prescribing or dispensing”405 of opioids for 
patients complaining of chronic pain. 
While many pain treatment advocates viewed the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in the Hurwitz case as a victory, because it allowed a jury to 
consider whether the physician was acting in good faith when he prescribed 
the drugs at issue, I have argued elsewhere that it is 
not at all clear that it has rectified the imbalance of the current law, which 
seems uncomfortably close to a civil negligence standard.  An objective 
good faith test to determine whether a physician is prescribing within the 
‘usual course of professional practice’ and for a ‘legitimate medical 
purpose’ appears virtually identical to [a medical malpractice standard 
wherein the inquiry is] whether the physician was prescribing consistent with 
the current standard of care.406 
Not only are the standards difficult to differentiate, but the evidence 
necessary to establish violation of each standard is practically the same.  In 
applying the malpractice standard, courts typically consider whether the 
physician performed a thorough exam, took the patient’s medical history, 
asked about other drug use, and prescribed the appropriate drug or 
dosage.407  In prosecuting physicians under the CSA, law enforcers seem to 
be focusing on similar standard of care issues, particularly the volume and 
dosage of narcotics that physicians are prescribing.408 
 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id.  Such a benefit might include “cash, sexual favors, [or] continuing to receive 
payment for maintaining an unnecessary doctor-patient relationship.”  Id. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Stephen E. Stone, former Associate Chief Counsel of DEA, describes some of the 
elements that make up prescribing in the course of one’s “professional practice”: 
In order for a practitioner to prescribe or dispense in the course of his professional 
practice, there must exist between the doctor and the “patient” a valid physician-
patient relationship.  To establish this relationship, the patient must come to the 
physician seeking treatment for some kind of physical or psychological condition or 
symptomology.  The physician must then obtain from the patient enough of a medical 
history, either through interview or by written form, to assist him in making a diagnosis 
of the complaint and the patient’s general physical condition.  Moreover, the physician 
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Clearly, focusing on volume and dosage is not an appropriate basis for 
arrest when expert medical opinion is that no consistent upper limit to 
prescribing for pain across all patients exists.  Rather, it is the quantity of 
medication that eliminates the patient’s pain without serious adverse side 
effects that is appropriate.409  That dosage is unique for each patient.  
Nevertheless, it appears from both news accounts and DEA literature that 
many doctors have been investigated because of the large volumes of 
opioids they prescribe and because they are seeing patients from outside of 
the state where they practice.410  In part, these prescribing practices result 
from non-pain experts referring to these doctors out of fear of regulatory 
scrutiny.411  Therefore, a small number of doctors are becoming saddled 
with treating a large number of patients in pain. 
Because arguments have been made on appeal in a number of these 
cases that the jury instructions were inappropriate for failing to sufficiently 
distinguish between a civil and criminal standard, several appellate courts 
have addressed the issue.412  The most recent is the Fourth Circuit in United 
States v. McIver.413  McIver “argue[d] that by referring to ‘norms of 
professional practice’ in the jury instructions, the district court improperly 
allowed the jury to convict on a civil, rather than a criminal, standard of 
proof.”414  The Fourth Circuit admitted that the potential for juries to confuse 
the civil and criminal standard in these cases “requires courts to exercise 
care in setting out the governing standard.”415  Despite this admission, the 
court clung to the notion that courts and jurors can adequately differentiate 
the two norms of behavior.416  Yet, in the end, it approved a jury instruction 
that arguably went beyond what is required by the current statutory 
standard.  In McIver, the district judge instructed the jury that the 
government had to prove that the physician “used ‘his authority to prescribe 
controlled substances . . . not for treatment of a patient, but for the purpose 
 
must conduct an examination or other medically recognized procedure sufficient to 
make a diagnosis.  Finally, there must be a logical connection, or nexus, between the 
drug ultimately prescribed and the physical or psychological condition diagnosed. 
Stone, supra note 222, at 24. 
 409. See supra text accompanying notes 291-94. 
 410. See supra Part II. 
 411. See infra Part VIII.C. 
 412. See, e.g., United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alerre, 
430 F.3d 681 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 F.3d 1132 (4th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 413. 470 F.3d at 557. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. at 558. 
 416. See id. at 559. 
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of assisting another in the maintenance of a drug habit’ or some other 
illegitimate purposes, such as his own ‘personal profit.’”417  The Fourth 
Circuit concluded that “[t]his instruction set the proper threshold for 
conviction by placing unlawful conduct beyond the bounds of any legitimate 
medical practice, including that which would constitute civil negligence.”418 
While these instructions do appear to set a higher bar than those 
required by the prevailing law or those that have been given in other 
prosecutions of physicians for illegally prescribing controlled substances,419 
they only represent a part of the overall instructions.  Jurors were also told 
that they should “consider the extent to which ‘any violation of professional 
norms . . . committed by the defendant interfered with his treatment of his 
patients and contributed to an over prescription and/or excessive 
dispensation of controlled substances.’”420  Although the court subsequently 
stated “that ‘a violation of a professional norm does not in and of itself 
establish a violation of [a] criminal law,’”421 subsequent interviews with 
jurors in the case indicate that jurors were confused about the relevant 
standard.422 
Apparently, juries are, in fact, often confused in these cases.423  
Although courts that allow expert testimony to establish the standard of care 
 
 417. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 1292). 
 418. McIver, 470 F.3d at 559. 
 419. The court, in fact, distinguishes the instructions in McIver from those given in two prior 
cases where the defendant also alleged that the court had applied a civil negligence standard 
rather than a criminal standard.  Id. at 558-60.  In United States v. Tran Trong Cuong, 18 
F.3d 1132 (4th Cir. 1994), the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that during the trial, the district 
court had confused the two standards, but nevertheless determined that the jury instructions 
were appropriate when the jury was instructed “to consider all of the defendant’s actions, and 
provide[] specific examples of behavior that tended to denote illegitimacy, such as prescribing 
drugs without performing physical examinations, or asking patients about the amount or type 
of drugs they want.”  McIver, 470 F.3d at 558.  The McIver court also referred to the jury 
instructions in United States v. Alerre (4th Cir. 2005), 430 F.3d 681.  See McIver, 470 F.3d at 
558. 
 420. McIver, 470 F.3d at 559 (quoting jury instructions in Joint Appendix at 1293). 
 421. See id. at 560 (alteration in original) (quoting jury instructions in Joint Appendix at 
1293). 
 422. See Rosenberg, supra note 162, at 55. 
 423. Jurors in the Hurwitz case, for example, were influenced by the evidence that Hurwitz 
did not pick up on certain “red flags” indicating that his patients had used controlled 
substances for recreational purposes and were likely to do so again (e.g., they had been 
arrested for drug trafficking, had several positive tests for cocaine, or had called in to his 
office for early refills of their medication in a short period of time).  See Tierney Lab: Putting 
Ideas in Science to the Test, at http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/30/hurwitz-
jurors-explain-their-verdict/ (Apr. 30, 2007, 5:38 EST); Tierney Lab: Putting Ideas in Science 
to the Test, at http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/the-hurwitz-jurors-explain-
further/ (May 2, 2007, 20:14 EST). 
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state that “mere” malpractice/civil negligence is not enough for a criminal 
conviction and instruct that a physician’s failure to meet the relevant 
standard must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, such instructions 
are insufficient to cure any confusion of civil and criminal standards on the 
part of lay juries. 
The confusion created by the current standard may also encourage 
physicians to under treat pain or to stop treating chronic pain patients 
altogether.  Fear of potential criminal liability, however, is only one side of 
the legal pressures they face.  Physicians who undertreat pain or who ignore 
patient complaints of pain also face potential civil malpractice liability and 
disciplinary action.424  In addition, if a physician suspects that a patient is 
abusing or diverting drugs, in order to protect him or herself from criminal 
liability, the physician may decide to terminate the patient-physician 
relationship.  While physicians may stop prescribing a drug whenever the 
risks, including potential abuse, outweigh the benefits, they may face a 
lawsuit or disciplinary action for patient abandonment if they stop treating a 
patient without adequate notice and an opportunity for the patient to find 
another healthcare provider.425  Abruptly stopping treatment of a patient on 
opioids also creates healthcare risks, including painful withdrawal 
symptoms, unless the patient is gradually weaned off the medication. 
In sum, the current legal framework makes physicians risk criminal 
liability for prescribing opioids when they know or should have known that a 
patient is abusing or diverting his or her drugs (even if the patients are also 
in pain) and risk civil liability or professional disciplinary action if they ignore 
their patient’s requests for pain relief or abandon their patient because they 
believe the patient has diverted their drugs.  Given the difficulty in 
determining when a patient is abusing or diverting and the simultaneous 
legal risks for undertreating and abandonment, the current criminal 
standard is inappropriate and should be changed. 
 
 424. See Matthew Yi, Doctor Found Reckless for Not Relieving Pain: $1.5 Million Jury 
Verdict for Family of Cancer Patient Who Went Home to Hayward to Die, S.F. CHRON., June 
14, 2001, at A1 (describing case against Dr. Wing Chin); see also supra note 288 and 
accompanying text. 
 425. The Vermont Board of Medical Practice, for example, considers abandonment 
unprofessional conduct and considers the following factors in determining whether termination 
was appropriate: (1) physician provided timely written notice (at least 30 days, presented to 
patient in a manner to ensure receipt); (2) physician provided care in transition period (at least 
30 days); (3) physician transferred records to new physician.  VT. BD. OF MED. PRACTICE, 
ADVISORY: TERMINATION OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP (1999), available at 
http://healthvermont.gov/hc/med_board/documents/010699terminationadvisory.pdf (last 
visited July 23, 2008). 
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B. Constitutional Violations 
At least two constitutional arguments can be made to challenge the 
arrest and prosecution of physicians treating pain patients.  First, the 
standard that is being applied is unconstitutionally vague.  Second, using 
the standard to confine or take away a physician’s ability to practice may 
substantially interfere with chronic pain patients’ constitutional right to pain 
treatment. 
1. Void for Vagueness 
Shortly after Congress passed the CSA, two court cases addressed the 
issue of whether the CSA’s provisions making “it illegal for a physician to 
dispense directly to the ultimate user a schedule II controlled substance 
other than ‘in the course of his professional practice’” was unconstitutionally 
vague.426  In United States v. Collier, Dr. Collier argued that the words “in 
the course of his professional practice” fail to adequately “warn the 
physician of what conduct is proscribed, and that the statute is without 
objective standards and is subject to diverse interpretation.”427  The court 
acknowledged that “[i]n making a medical judgment concerning the right 
treatment for an individual patient, physicians require a certain latitude of 
available options.”428  Thus, “‘[w]hat constitutes bona fide medical practice 
must be determined upon consideration of evidence and attending 
circumstances.’”429  However, the court concluded that such circumstantial 
evidence can be sufficiently clear so as not to be unconstitutionally vague 
and referred to two “recent” decisions of the Supreme Court regarding state 
statutes that make physician performance of abortion criminal if not 
“‘necessary’” or  not “‘necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or 
health.’”430  According to the Collier court, the Supreme Court decided that 
both statutes were constitutionally valid despite neither defining these 
terms.431 
In United States v. Rosenberg, the court rejected the defendant 
physician’s contention that the phrase “in the course of professional 
practice” appearing in 21 U.S.C. § 802(20)432 is so vague that it violates 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and pointed out that the 
 
 426. United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1973); see United States v. 
Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 427. Collier, 478 F.2d at 271. 
 428. Id. at 272 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)). 
 429. Id. (quoting Linder, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)) (alteration in original). 
 430. Id. at 272 (quoting Doe, 410 U.S. at 192; United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71 
(1971)). 
 431. Id. 
 432. Section 802(20) referred to in Rosenberg is section 802(21) in the current U.S.C. 
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language in question “has been in the statute books since 1914 and no one 
has ever had problems with its interpretation.”433  The court stated that it 
was convinced by the ease and consistency with which the language had 
been interpreted by the courts that it was not vague and that it was “difficult 
to see how the language [could] be made more precise and at the same 
time ban the undesirable conduct on the part of physicians which Congress 
[had] intended to make illegal and subject to sanctions.”434  Judge Ely, in his 
dissenting opinion, however, was strident in his disagreement with the 
majority, arguing that “Congress has, without doubt, used language that is 
‘. . . so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess [as 
to] its meaning and differ as to its application.’ . . . The Constitution plainly 
condemns such vagueness, especially in criminal statutes.”435 
While the majority’s view might have been true in the context of 
physicians like Rosenberg, who prescribed controlled substances to 
individuals who never indicated a need for the medications, it is much more 
complex when the physician is prescribing to treat pain.  Moreover, the 
standard is arguably vaguer today than it was thirty years ago.  Today, while 
there is increased awareness of the need to treat non-cancer chronic pain, 
differences of opinion remain in the medical community over whether 
certain patterns of prescribing for pain treatment are appropriate.  The 
standard of care in the treatment of non-malignant chronic pain patients is 
an area of medical practice in which the boundaries and contours are in flux 
and one in which the boundaries may differ significantly from patient to 
patient.  While some patients may not tolerate even small doses due to 
certain side effects, others are able to tolerate extremely high doses with little 
or no ill effects.  As a result, the statutory language as it applies to 
physicians treating chronic pain patients is, arguably, unconstitutionally 
vague and there is a need for an alternative standard that provides 
physicians with greater clarity. 
2. Liberty Interest in Pain Treatment 
A second legal argument against the current standard is that its 
application and enforcement violates patients’ constitutional right to 
adequate pain treatment.  In the aftermath of Washington v. Glucksberg436 
and Vacco v. Quill,437 a constitutional right to adequate pain treatment 
arguably exists.  If so, prosecuting doctors for over-prescribing may put an 
 
 433. United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 197 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 434. Id. at 198. 
 435. Id. at 204 (Ely, J., dissenting) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 
391 (1926)) (first and third alterations in original). 
 436. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 437. 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
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undue burden on the exercise of that constitutional right.  In a 1997 New 
England Journal of Medicine article, Professor Robert Burt argued that a 
majority of the Supreme Court believes “that states must not impose barriers 
on the availability of palliative care for terminally ill patients.”438  Moreover, 
he argued that the rulings in Glucksberg and Quill “would have the same 
status as the right to an abortion established by Roe v. Wade—that is, an 
individual right that cannot be overridden by state actions prohibiting or 
‘unreasonably burdening’ access to a physician’s assistance.”439  Professor 
Burt asserts that, as a result, current state laws that restrict the availability of 
opioids for pain management, such as “[r]estrictive prescription laws, the 
imposition of rigid limitations on dosages, and administrative burdens such 
as the requirement of triplicate forms,” may be challenged by pain treatment 
advocates.440 
Neither the Supreme Court Justices nor Burt discuss the treatment of 
chronic pain patients.  Rather, their remarks are limited to palliative care for 
the terminally ill.  Yet, the right to pain relief for those suffering from severe 
chronic pain would seem to be implicit in the right to pain relief for dying 
patients based on the Court’s rationale for the latter.  Beth Packman 
Weinman relies on the concurring opinions of Justices Breyer and Stevens to 
make this argument.441  Using Justice Breyer’s remarks about a liberty 
interest in pain relief as a starting point, Packman asserts that “[j]ust as 
severe pain at the end of life presents an indignity that violates the protected 
liberty interest, one can make a strong argument that a life with continuous, 
chronic severe pain is also a life without dignity, and consequently, without 
liberty.”442  She couples Justice Stevens’s remarks with Breyer’s and states 
that “[l]ike Justice Breyer, Justice Stevens explicitly argues that accessing 
treatment to alleviate unwanted pain and suffering at the end of life is at the 
heart of the liberty interest.”443  Moreover, she states that “[i]t would be hard 
to imagine that this argument does not include within it a liberty interest in 
freedom from unwanted pain and suffering for those who are not terminally 
ill.”444 
 
 438. Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional 
Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1235 (1997). 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id. 
 441. See Beth Packman Weinman, Freedom from Pain: Establishing a Constitutional Right 
to Pain Relief, 24 J. LEG. MED. 495, 527-29 (2003). 
 442. Id. at 528. 
 443. Id. at 529. 
 444. Id.; see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (stating that being 
free to take available medications to alleviate pain is “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty” such “that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed” and “so rooted 
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 While prosecution of doctors under section 841 of the CSA does not 
directly restrict patient access to controlled substances, such prosecution 
does burden the exercise of the constitutional right by deterring doctors from 
prescribing, even when a patient’s need is legitimate.445  Jurisprudence 
analyzing the “undue burden” of state abortion laws appears to support a 
conclusion that laws criminalizing physician prescribing or opioid analgesics 
place an undue burden on a patient’s right to palliative care.446  While the 
“undue burden” on pain patients resulting from the prosecution of 
physicians is more attenuated than that posed by the obstacles put in the 
way of abortion seekers by state statutes (i.e., waiting periods, requirements 
of a second opinion, parental consent), the burden may be more significant 
in the pain treatment context.  Improper prosecutions not only place 
significant obstacles on prosecuted physician’s patients, they also have a 
“chilling effect” on other physicians treating chronic pain patients, i.e., they 
subsequently may refuse to treat pain patients.447  In some ways, the 
situation is analogous to the abortion context where fewer and fewer 
physicians are willing to provide abortions, not because of the threat of 
criminal prosecution, but because of the increasing legal limits on 
performing abortions.448  In both contexts, patients often have to travel 
 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”) (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). 
 445. Studies have established that there is a “chilling effect” on physician prescribing of 
opioids resulting from legal sanctions for such prescribing. See Charles Schmidt, Experts 
Worry About Chilling Effect of Federal Regulations on Treating Pain, 97 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 
554 (2005). Contra News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., The Myth of the “Chilling 
Effect” (Oct. 30, 2003), at www.dea.gov/pubs/pressrel/pr103003p.html (last visited July 23, 
2008). 
 446. Burt suggests that physicians threatened with disciplinary action by state medical 
boards for prescribing large volumes of pain medications may be able to protect themselves 
by arguing that their patients have a “constitutional right to adequate palliative care.”  Burt, 
supra note 438, at 1236. 
 447. See Schmidt, supra note 445. Contra News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 
supra note 445; see also note 14, supra. 
 448. See GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES (2008), at 
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html (last visited July 23, 2008) (citing Rachel 
K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40 
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 11 tbl.3 (2008) (noting that the number of U.S. 
abortion providers declined by 2% between 2000 and 2005 (from 1,819 to 1,787)); see also 
Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States 
in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 10, 13-14 (2003) (documenting the 
continuing decline in U.S. abortion providers, from a high of 2,908 in 1982, to 1,819 in 
2000, and attributing the trend to “increasing legal constraints on the circumstances under 
which abortions may be performed” and the increased risk of violence from anti-abortionists). 
See infra notes 460-466, 474 and accompanying text for information as to how the arrest and 
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significant distances to find a physician who will treat them or provide the 
desired service. 
A potential counter argument is that the state or federal government has 
a legitimate interest in preventing the abuse and diversion of addictive 
narcotics that trumps the individual’s right to adequate pain treatment.  Burt 
considers that states could attempt to defend laws restricting access to pain 
medications for end of life care as justified in order to prevent abuse and 
diversion for illegal purposes but argues that such a state interest would only 
trump an interest in providing adequate pain relief if the courts found it 
appropriate “to give higher priority to the ‘war on drugs’ than to providing 
adequate palliative care for dying patients.”449  While preventing drug 
addiction and abuse is a legitimate interest, it should not overcome the 
individual’s right to pain relief in the context of either end of life care or 
chronic pain treatment.450 
C. Current Law and Enforcement Practices: An Egregious Imbalance 
The competing policy goals of eliminating drug diversion and abuse and 
appropriately treating pain are brought into stark relief by the government’s 
policies and practices regarding drug enforcement.  With most regulations, 
the government may either overreach with its regulatory net, capturing too 
many innocent individuals (false positives), or underreach, failing to capture 
guilty individuals (false negatives).  Scientists refer to these errors inherent in 
virtually all regulatory schemes respectively as Type I and Type II errors.451  
The question is whether we should be depriving patients in pain of needed 
opioids (a result of Type I errors) in order to prevent their use for non-
medical purposes (a result of Type II errors).  While the DEA has recognized 
 
prosecution of pain physicians has affected the number of physicians willing to treat patients 
with chronic pain and the impact it has had on pain patients. 
 449. Burt, supra note 438, at 1235-36. 
 450. See id. at 1236 (concluding that “[t]he generalized goal of narcotics control could not 
. . . take precedence over an individual’s constitutional right to adequate palliative care”); see 
also Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, The Supreme Court Addresses Physician-Assisted Suicide: Can 
Its Rulings Improve Palliative Care?, 8 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 200, 201 (1999) (arguing that the 
majority opinion in both Glucksburg and Quill “concludes that the double-effect doctrine 
provides a rational and constitutional basis for states to allow narcotics given in high dosages 
for pain relief in terminally ill patients, while prohibiting assisted suicide” and that “[t]he 
concurring justices go further, suggesting that the state is obligated to permit physicians to 
provide adequate pain relief at the end of life, even if such care leads to unconsciousness or 
hastens death”).  Alpers and Lo further assert that “[t]hese concurring opinions . . . may 
establish a right to pain relief that is closely allied with other personal rights such as the right 
to an abortion or the right to refuse medical treatment.”  Id. 
 451. See American College of Physicians, Primer on Type I and Type II Errors, 4 EFFECTIVE 
CLINICAL PRAC. 284, 284-85 (2001), available at www.acponline.org/clinical_information/ 
journals_publications/ecp/novdec01/primer_errors.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008). 
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the importance of pain treatment through official statements,452 its practices 
do not give adequate weight to this policy goal.453  Arguably, state and 
federal drug enforcement agents are grossly overreaching with regard to 
drug policy enforcement, resulting in too many false positives.  If regulators 
and prosecutors must err in their enforcement and prosecution with respect 
to this issue, it would be more appropriate as a policy matter to underreach 
than overreach.  Such a result, reducing Type I errors, and concomitantly 
increasing Type II errors, is defensible on both utilitarian and deontological 
grounds. 
1. Utilitarian Analysis 
a. The Costs of Overreaching 
A utilitarian analysis of this issue requires an articulation and 
quantification of the costs and benefits of overreaching as compared to 
underreaching.  In this context, overreaching means arresting and 
prosecuting physicians who are legitimately treating pain patients.  The costs 
of such erroneous actions are sweeping.  Not only does the innocent 
physician bear the costs of the harm, including loss of livelihood that may 
impact the individual and his/her family or dependents, the humiliation, 
embarrassment, and physical stress of public arrest and prosecution, and 
the cost of a legal defense, but others also suffer from the prosecution’s 
ripple effect.  This ripple effect includes harms to the physician’s current pain 
patients who may not be able to find another physician who will treat their 
pain, as well as to other current and future chronic pain patients who may 
not be able to find a pain treatment practitioner because of the chilling 
effect such criminal actions have on physicians’ general willingness to treat 
chronic pain.  The DEA’s view is that these high-profile cases “‘have been a 
learning lesson to other physicians’”—that other physicians are much more 
cautious now of how they prescribe narcotics.454  Unfortunately, it appears 
that many are so cautious they will no longer prescribe narcotics as pain 
treatment or treat pain patients at all.  They fear that prescribing “opium-
 
 452. In 1999, drug enforcement officials from the DEA and twenty-one health 
organizations issued a joint statement to announce that they had begun to work “together to 
prevent abuse of prescription pain medications while ensuring that they remain available for 
patients in need.”  A JOINT STATEMENT FROM 21 HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS & THE DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., PROMOTING PAIN RELIEF AND PREVENTING ABUSE OF PAIN MEDICATIONS: A 
CRITICAL BALANCING ACT (2001), available at www.aslme.org/news/press_conference/ 
consensus.pdf (last visited July 23, 2008). 
 453. See Dispensing Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain, 71 Fed. Reg. 
52,716 (Sept. 6, 2006). 
 454. See Kaufman, supra note 6 (quoting statement of Elizabeth Willis, Chief of Drug 
Operations, Office of Diversion Control, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin.). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
296 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:231 
based drugs for pain is becoming criminalized by aggressive drug agents 
and zealous prosecutors.”455 
A number of pain treatment advocates have decried this chilling effect, 
arguing that 
[o]ne of the saddest and least noticed consequences of the war on drugs is 
the under-treatment and non-treatment of chronic pain.  Literally hundreds 
of thousands of patients endure needless agony—in some cases turning to 
suicide for relief because they could not find a doctor willing to prescribe 
adequate doses of narcotics for them.456 
At the time of Dr. Hurwitz’s medical board hearing, Russell Portenoy, 
then co-chief of Palliative Care at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center 
in New York, stated that “most physicians are reluctant to treat pain with 
narcotics, fearing they will face criminal or regulatory investigations.”457  
Hurwitz was one of the few physicians at the time who was willing to 
prescribe large doses of narcotics to non-terminally ill pain patients.  Many 
of his patients “spoke of living in agony before finding pain relief from 
narcotics.”458  But the evidence is more than anecdotal.  Several studies 
have confirmed the chilling impact of potential legal sanctions for 
prescribing of narcotics for pain treatment.459  
 The DEA argues that because the number of DEA registrants has 
increased each year since 1999, the agency’s increased scrutiny of 
physicians for opioid prescribing has not caused a chilling effect.460  
However, while many physicians are registered to prescribe scheduled 
drugs, pain treatment advocates argue that many of them do not prescribe 
scheduled drugs, or do not prescribe them on a long-term basis, and the 
burden of prescribing opioids for chronic pain patients falls primarily on 
approximately 4,000–6,000 physicians who specialize in pain 
 
 455. Id. 
 456. Drug Reform Coordination Network, supra note 107. 
 457. Peter Finn, D.C. Internist’s Case Spurs Concerns Over Prescribed Narcotics, WASH. 
POST, June 18, 1996, at D3. 
 458. Id. 
 459. See, e.g., Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the 
Pain Relief Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 319, 320 (1996); Sharon M. Weinstein et al., 
Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Pain and the Use of Opioid Analgesics: Results of  a Survey from 
the Texas Cancer Pain Initiative, 93 S. MED. J. 479 (2000). 
 460. See News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., supra note 445 (“Since FY 1999 
the DEA registrant population has continually increased reaching almost 1 million doctors (as 
of June 30, 2003).  During this same time, DEA has pursued sanctions on less than one tenth 
of one percent of the registered doctors.”). 
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management.461  Professor Ronald Libby has argued that in many states a 
very small number of physicians prescribe a large volume of opioids.462 
According to some, few enough physicians in the country are willing to 
prescribe narcotics for chronic pain that patients might travel hundreds of 
miles to see them.463  One physician used the term “the Painful 
Underground Railroad” to describe the system now in play for patients with 
chronic pain to find physicians who will treat them.464  Others have labeled 
doctors’ fear of prescribing medications for their patient’s pain as 
“opiophobia.”465  News stories have reported that some doctors display 
signs in their offices that say ‘Don’t ask for OxyContin’ or ‘No OxyContin 
prescribed here’ and that medical schools are advising “students not to 
choose pain management as a career because the field is too fraught with 
potential legal dangers.”466 
 To fully understand the costs of overreaching, one must also consider 
the costs of untreated pain for patients unable to find a physician who will 
treat their pain.  For example, when Dr. Frank Fisher was arrested, many of 
his patients were unable to find care.467  According to one news account, 
hundreds of his patients “deteriorated unnecessarily, and several . . . 
died.”468  At the time of his arrest, “twenty-five people who had been 
working, with Dr. Fisher’s help, were forced to apply for full disability.”469 
 The American Academy of Pain Management estimates that “about 50 
million Americans live with chronic pain, caused by cancer, other diseases 
 
 461. See Otesa Middleton, FDA Panel: OxyContin’s Approval Shouldn’t Be Limited, DOW 
JONES NEWSWIRES, Sept. 9, 2003 (statement of Dr. J. David Haddox, Purdue Pharma); Libby, 
supra note 14, at 2 (estimating the number of physicians who specialize in the treatment of 
chronic pain as between 4,278 and 5,869). 
 462. See Libby, supra note 301 (“One percent of the physicians in Florida were 
responsible for prescribing large doses of OxyContin and other narcotics.  If Florida is 
representative of the country, that means that only one percent of the 963,385 physicians are 
responsible for treating between 30 and 80 million chronic and cancer patients in the 
country.”); see also Fred Schulte, Drugging the Poor; Deaths Mount as Doctors, Pharmacists 
and Patients Abuse the Medicaid System, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Nov. 30, 2003, 
at 1A (stating that based on the newspaper’s own records review, sixteen doctors in Florida 
had each ordered more than $1 million in opiates during the “past three years,” compared to 
only 574 out of the 56,926 medical professionals in Florida who had ordered more than 
$100,000 in pharmacy billings during that same time). 
 463. Sullum, supra note 104, at 23. 
 464. Id. (quoting Dr. Harvey L. Rose, a Carmichael, California, family practitioner who 
battled state regulators accusing him of excessive prescribing). 
 465. Id.; see also Morgan, supra note 272 (discussing physician phobia of prescribing 
opioids that results from misconceptions about drug use and abuse). 
 466. Owen, supra note 199, at 42. 
 467. DRUG WAR CHRON., supra note 52. 
 468. Id. 
 469. Id. 
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and disorders, and accidents [and that] [a]nother 25 million live with acute 
pain caused by surgery or accidents.”470  Moreover, “[t]he majority of those 
with the most severe pain do not have it under control and suffer 
substantially in their enjoyment of life, their social relations, and their 
economic productivity.”471 
 Estimates of costs associated with loss of productivity due to pain have 
been as high as $100 billion per year.  A study published in 2003 on lost 
work time and costs due to pain conditions concluded that “[p]ain is an 
inordinately common and disabling condition in the US workforce,” costing 
employers an “estimated $61.2 billion per year in pain-related lost 
productive time.”472  But in addition to work related costs, “pain [also] has a 
tremendous physiologic, sociologic, psychological and existential impact on 
the individual and society;” it affects marriages, families, and friendships as 
well as careers.473   
 Costs to individuals with untreated pain may defy quantification.  Pain 
patients say “[t]heir pain . . . [is] like being on fire[,] . . . like having an 
electrode shoot juice up your neck all day[,] . . . like having a car parked on 
your face.  So intense [is] their torment . . . that suicide often seem[s] the 
better alternative.”474  In some cases, before they found relief from opioid 
analgesics these individuals were bedridden for years.475  Their problems 
ranged from “crushed vertebrae and damaged jaws, [to] congenital bowel 
inflammations and disintegrating hips, [to] terrible burns and monstrous 
migraines.”476  Individuals with this type of intense and enduring pain may 
also suffer depression and/or commit suicide.477  One of Dr. Hurwitz’s 
patients, a  forty-two-year-old  resident  from upstate  New York, did, in fact, 
 
 470. The Infinite Mind, supra note 16; see also Kuehn, supra note 291, at 249 (citing a 
2005 telephone survey of a random sample of 1204 adults which found 19% of respondents 
reported chronic pain and 34% reported recurrent pain). 
 471. The Infinite Mind, supra note 16; see also Kuehn, supra note 291 (stating that 
“[s]ome 63% of patients with pain had spoken to their physician about their pain, but only 
31% reported complete relief and 21% reported little or no relief”). 
 472. Walter F. Stewart et al., Lost Productive Time and Cost Due to Common Pain 
Conditions in the US Workforce, 290 JAMA 2443, 2443, 2449 (2003). 
 473. See MICHAEL DREYFUSS, OUR CHRONIC PAIN MISSION, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF PAIN 
DOCS IMPEDES PAIN TREATMENT, at www.cpmission.com/main/painpolitics/impedes.html (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2008) (quoting John F. Peppin, owner of the Iowa Pain Management Clinic). 
 474. Allen, supra note 113, at 12. 
 475. See id. (referring to one of Dr. Hurwitz’s patients who was bedridden for two 
decades). 
 476. Id. at 15. 
 477. See id. at 12, 15 (describing the experiences of Dr. Hurwitz’s patients). 
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commit suicide when Hurwitz was unable to find another physician who 
would treat him.478 
 While there are several anecdotal reports of such deaths, no accurate 
statistics of the number of individuals who take their own lives as a result of 
untreated pain exist.  The Pain Relief Network, however, claims that 
American citizens “by the thousands are being forced into suicide by 
untreated pain.”479 
b. The Benefits of Overreaching 
In an evenhanded policy analysis, the benefits of overreaching must also 
be described.  These benefits may include preventing drug addiction and 
diversion.  Harms associated with addiction include decline of the addict’s 
physical health and productivity, financial and emotional harm to the 
addict’s family, increased crime when addicts steal or commit prostitution to 
maintain their habit, and even death due to drug overdose.  It is difficult to 
determine, however, the extent of harm that results when physicians 
inadvertently prescribe narcotics to an addict or to someone who sells them 
to an addict.  To the extent that the physician is “feeding the addict’s habit,” 
he may be worsening the addict’s health and allowing him or her to 
continue living in an unproductive way.  This result assumes, however, that 
the addict would have otherwise sought treatment or that by the physician 
refusing the addict drugs, he or she would be more likely to seek treatment. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether one can attribute an increase in crime to 
a physician giving an addict a narcotic when it is more likely that the addict 
would not have to steal or prostitute him or herself to obtain the narcotic he 
or she seeks.  On the other hand, a physician could increase the circulation 
of narcotics in the “market” by prescribing to a patient who subsequently 
diverts the drugs, selling them illegally to addicts or other abusers.  
According to one source, some jurisdictions have reported “as much as a 
 
 478. Drug Reform Coordination Network, supra note 107 (“[The] patient had been seeing 
Dr. Hurwitz for three years for back and neck pain due to injuries sustained in an auto 
accident.  His pharmacy refused to fill Dr. Hurwitz’s District of Columbia prescriptions after 
learning of the Virginia medical board’s disciplinary action against him, despite his having 
been on a stable regimen for over a year.  With the help of a member of the AMA Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Dr. Hurwitz was able to make arrangements for the patient to be 
treated at a clinic in New Jersey and flown there for free.  The patient had run out of his 
medications, however, and didn’t feel he could make the trip without them.  No local clinic 
was willing to provide him with a short-term prescription.  In the meantime, a SWAT team of 
the local police, having been notified of a possible suicide, surrounded his house.  The 
patient, a former policeman himself, proceeded to take his own life.”). 
 479. James L. Schaller, Why Are Kind, Ethical & Caring Physicians Treating Your Pain 
Being Targeted by Tax-Funded Government?, at www.personalconsult.com/articles/ 
painreliefnetwork.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2008). 
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75% increase in property and other crimes that they specifically attribute to 
the abuse of OxyContin.”480 
Numerous news stories describe cases of pain patients who have 
become “addicted” to their pain medication; however, it is not clear whether 
these patients are truly addicted or are, instead, physically dependent.  
According to pain treatment experts, “patients treated with prolonged opioid 
therapy usually do develop physical dependence and sometimes develop 
tolerance, but do not usually develop addictive disorders. . . . Addiction, 
unlike tolerance and physical dependence, is not a predictable drug effect, 
but represents an idiosyncratic adverse reaction in biologically and 
psychosocially vulnerable individuals.”481 
Overreaching may also save some lives because it may prevent a 
patient or someone to whom a patient sells or gives a prescription or drug 
from overdosing.  Estimates of the number of overdose deaths due to 
OxyContin differ.  Various sources report between 146 and 500 deaths 
from OxyContin overdose in 2000 and 2001.482  Yet, it is uncertain that 
OxyContin was the primary cause of death as the subjects often had 
consumed alcohol or other drugs in addition to oxycodone.  An article in 
the Journal of Analytical Toxicology found only twelve cases in one year “in 
which OxyContin was the sole cause of death; all the others fell victim to 
poly-drug abuse—mixing OxyContin with cocaine, alcohol, Valium, or 
various other substances.”483  Thus, attributing these deaths to inappropriate 
physician prescribing would seem unjustified; although, perhaps they would 
have been prevented (in a lengthy backward looking “but for” causation 
analysis) if the physician had not prescribed the drug at all. 
 Others have made the point that even if these deaths could have been 
prevented, the total deaths attributable “to OxyContin over a period of two 
years represent just one-third of the deaths linked to acetaminophen in a 
 
 480. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 10. 
 481. DEFINITIONS RELATED TO THE USE OF OPIOIDS, supra note 304; see also text 
accompanying notes 304-308. 
 482. See Ammann, supra note 198, at 32 (citing the DEA figure of 146 deaths involving 
OxyContin over a two-year period); OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMIN., DRUGS AND CHEMICALS OF CONCERN: SUMMARY OF MEDICAL EXAMINER REPORTS ON 
OXYCODONE-RELATED DEATHS, at www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/drugs_concern/oxycodone/ 
oxycontin7.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (stating that for 2000 and 2001, “146 deaths were 
categorized as ‘OxyContin verified’ deaths; 318 deaths were re-categorized as ‘OxyContin 
likely’”); see also Owen, supra note 199, at 44 (stating that “[f]ederal officials claim that 
nearly 500 people died from overdosing on OxyContin in 2002”). 
 483. Owen, supra note 199, at 44 (citing Edward J. Cone et al., Oxycodone Involvement 
in Drug Abuse Deaths: A DAWN-Based Classification Scheme Applied to an Oxycodone 
Postmortem Database Containing Over 1000 Cases, 27 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 57 
(2003)). 
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single year.”484  While many more people take acetaminophen than 
OxyContin, the comparison illustrates that in many other areas we tolerate 
increased risk and adverse side effects because they are overshadowed by 
the therapeutic benefit the drug provides and raises questions about why we 
treat opioids differently.  In both cases, the deaths may be intentional or 
accidental.  The difference appears to be the possibility of addiction to the 
opioids.  
 In sum, in order to truly understand the costs and benefits of 
overreaching by prosecutors, we need some idea of (1) the numbers of 
individuals likely denied pain relief because of the arrest and prosecution of 
physicians for prescribing opioids related to pain treatment and (2) the 
number of individuals who become addicted or maintain an addiction 
because a physician intentionally or unintentionally gives a patient an opioid 
prescription.  Although exact numbers are not currently available, the 
number of individuals with untreated pain is orders of magnitude greater 
than those who become addicted to opioids, whether as a result of receiving 
a legitimate prescription or receiving the drug through illegitimate channels.  
Weinman cites the difference at “‘56 million persons in pain” versus “2.6 
million abusers.’”485 
Lastly, as a policy matter, we must ask whether the law enforcement 
strategy of targeting physicians is the most effective means of reducing 
narcotic abuse and addiction.  The government’s decision to target 
physicians in their war on prescription drug abuse seems inherently 
misguided.  The most common means of opioid drug diversion have been 
described by DEA as “fraudulent prescriptions, doctor shopping, over-
prescribing, and pharmacy theft.”486  Physicians are arguably responsible 
only for “over-prescribing,” and it is debatable how much over-prescribing is 
actually taking place and whether this is the source of most opiate drug 
diversion.  For example, individuals may obtain some drugs, including 
opioids, illegally over the Internet.487 
 
 484. Ammann, supra note 198, at 32; see also Weinman, supra note 441, at 502 (stating 
that the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) ranked oxycodone hydrochloride (the 
substance in OxyContin) seventeenth in the first half of 2000 “on the list of drugs responsible 
for drug-related visits to hospital emergency departments”;  however, both aspirin (ranked 
tenth) and ibuprofen (ranked eleventh) “were responsible for more emergency department 
visits than OxyContin”). 
 485. Weinman, supra note 441, at 503 (quoting Debra E. Heidrich, Controlled-Release 
Oxycodone Hydrochloride (OxyContin), 15 CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALIST 207, 208 (2001)). 
 486. OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL, supra note 10. 
 487. Office of Diversion Control, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., Question & Answers: 
Dispensing and Purchasing Controlled Substances over the Internet, at 
www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/faq/internetpurch.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (“The DEA 
recognizes that while some Internet sites facilitate legitimate prescribing and dispensing 
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2. Deontologic Arguments 
A practice which is likely to increase the number of individuals treated 
for chronic pain, even if it also results in a small increase in the number of 
individuals who become addicts or continue addictive behaviors (i.e., 
underreaching), can also be defended on deontological (moral) grounds.  
While moral arguments have largely been the mainstay of those arguing for 
stricter drug enforcement practices, those arguments may be trumped by 
higher moral values.  Those who espouse stricter drug enforcement 
practices (i.e., overreaching) believe that addiction is morally repugnant and 
leads to immoral behavior, e.g., theft and prostitution, separate and apart 
from the economic or physical harms associated with these behaviors.488  
This moral reprehensibility, they would argue, requires that we prevent such 
behavior at all costs (or without regard to cost).  In order to bolster their 
arguments, those with this view have often exaggerated both the number of 
addicts in this country and the crimes caused by addicts.489  In the context of 
pain patients, those arguing for stricter enforcement of drug laws believe 
that pain patients treated with opioids are highly likely to become addicted, 
which they believe is morally reprehensible.  However, it is equally 
reprehensible to fail to treat a patient’s pain. 
Arguably, there is a moral imperative to treat pain that rises to the level 
of a human rights issue.  The AMA has pronounced that “[p]hysicians have 
an obligation to relieve pain and suffering and to promote the dignity and 
autonomy of dying patients in their care[, including]  providing effective 
palliative treatment even though it may foreseeably hasten death.”490  Also, 
“[i]n 1997, the American Society of Addiction Medicine affirmed that 
physicians are obligated to relieve pain and suffering in their patients, 
including those with concurrent addictive disorders.”491  Linda Farber Post 
and her colleagues wrote of the moral imperative to treat pain, stating that 
 
practices, other sites facilitate the illegal sale of controlled substances.  These sites of illicit 
activity enable some consumers to illegally purchase controlled substances without realizing 
they are committing a crime.”). 
 488. See MUSTO, supra note 207, at 244 (describing the belief of historical proponents of 
strict narcotics controls that “the need for money to buy drugs or a direct physiological 
incitement to violence led to crime and immoral behavior”). 
 489. See id. at 246 (“Like the speculated percentage of crimes caused by narcotic use and 
sales, the number of addicts estimated for the nation appears often to have been 
exaggerated.”). 
 490. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES, H-140.966: 
DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE, at www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse& 
doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-140.966.HTM (last visited Aug. 5, 2008). 
 491. Hurwitz, supra note 272, at 13 (citing Rights and Responsibilities of Physicians in the 
Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Pain (adopted by the Am. Soc’y of Addiction Med. Bd. of 
Dirs., Apr. 16, 1997)). 
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the physician’s “obligation of beneficence requires physicians to do good 
and prevent harm” and that the list of goods typically includes “prolongation 
of life, restoration of function, and relief of pain and suffering.”492  The 
authors refer to the physician’s obligation to treat pain as “what moral 
philosophers call a prima facie or conditional obligation, something 
physicians ought to do unless some other duty or moral consideration takes 
precedence.”493  Some other duty might take precedence, for example, 
when a patient refuses pain medication out of concern that it may affect his 
or her intellectual awareness.494  In order to respect the patient’s autonomy, 
a physician, under these circumstances, could ethically decline to treat a 
patient’s pain.  However, when a patient requests pain relief both ethical 
principles of autonomy and beneficence merge to support an ethical 
obligation to treat the patient’s pain. 
An additional ethical argument against overreaching is the impact that it 
has on the doctor-patient relationship.  Doctors, as an initial matter, must 
develop a trusting relationship with their patients, which requires them to 
listen to their patients and believe their accounts of their symptoms.  As 
stated above, this is especially true in the field of pain management where 
there is no objective test for pain.  Neither is there a wholly accurate test to 
determine whether the patient is telling the truth or fabricating his 
symptoms.495  Physicians who ignore their patient’s pain accounts would be 
arguably negligent.496  Prosecutors and the DEA argue that “doctors violate 
the law when they prescribe pain pills to patients who they know—or 
reasonably should know—are selling or abusing the drugs.”497  But, this 
puts physicians in the position of being watch dogs for law enforcement or, 
at least, suspicious of their patients’ claims of pain.  It compromises the 
doctor-patient relationship.  Moreover, it seems wholly inappropriate as a 
test for criminal liability when the doctor faces legal risk for undertreating as 
well as overtreating pain.  William Hurwitz has argued that holding 
physicians responsible for their patients’ misbehavior puts doctors in a no 
 
 492. Linda Farber Post et al., Pain: Ethics, Culture, and Informed Consent to Relief, 24 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 348, 349 (1996). 
 493. Id. 
 494. Id. 
 495. See Hurwitz, supra note 272, at 14 (“Physicians usually can screen out the wholly 
fraudulent patient without a pain syndrome at all, but current medical technology includes 
neither a pain ‘meter’ nor other objective test to ensure against other forms of deception or 
medication misuse by patients.”). 
 496. See Ben A. Rich, Op-Ed, Physicians’ Legal Duty to Relieve Suffering, 175 W.J. MED. 
151, 152 (2001) (discussing the jury verdict against a doctor for undertreating his elderly 
patient’s pain, in Bergman v. Wing Chin, MD & Eden Med. Ctr., No. H205732-1 (Cal. App. 
Dep’t Super. Ct. 1999). 
 497. Vartabedian, supra note 202. 
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win situation: “It forces doctors who try to treat pain to act like police, 
reinforcing a perverse medical paternalism that subverts the ethical 
imperatives designed to protect patient autonomy and dignity.  This 
distortion of the patient-physician relationship stigmatizes patients and 
erodes their trust.”498 
Many physicians who work in pain clinics or who treat chronic pain 
patients already engage in highly intrusive behaviors in an effort to ensure 
that their patients are not drug addicts or diverters.  In fact, “[p]ain 
specialists—usually psychiatrists, anesthesiologists or neurosurgeons—often 
operate within the structure of large clinics that run patients through a 
gantlet [sic] of rehabilitation techniques, starting with the removal of all 
medications.”499  Then, “[o]nce patients do get narcotics, they must follow 
stringent rules to prevent abuse or diversion of the drugs.”500  As an 
example, the Community Health Projects Medical Group in California, 
which provides opioid therapy at thirty-five clinics, requires each patient to 
sign a thirty-six-page consent form.501  “[T]he form warns patients that in 
exchange for a maximum of 32 pills a day, they must follow scores of rules 
for behavior inside and outside the clinic, and can be dropped instantly and 
without recourse.”502  Pain clinics routinely ration pills, test urine “each visit 
to make sure the patient is using the medication, not selling it,” and require 
that patients “visit once or twice a month.”503 
 
 498. Hurwitz, supra note 272, at 14. 
 499. Allen, supra note 113, at 15. 
 500. Id. 
 501. Id. 
 502. Id. 
 503. Id.  Individual pain treatment practitioners may impose additional requirements.  See 
Walter A. Brown, Finessing the Fine Line Between Pain Management and Opioid Addiction, 3 
APPLIED NEUROLOGY 39, 40 (2007), available at http://appneurology.com/showArticle.jhtml 
?articleId=197003317 (last visited Aug. 9, 2008) (describing a neurologist with a practice 
focused primarily on pain management who “carries out unannounced pill counts and urine 
screens in all his patients who have NCP [nonmalignant chronic pain].  For the pill counts, he 
periodically calls each patient and tells them to get to a pharmacy within 2 hours and bring all 
their pills for the pharmacist to count.  He also periodically calls each patient and tells them to 
go to a nearby hospital or laboratory within 2 hours for a urine screen.  He doesn’t do these 
counts or urine screens during office visits because that is when patients expect them.”). 
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IX.  AN ALTERNATIVE STANDARD 
A. Moving away from a Criminal Approach 
The substantial overlap between the current criminal standard set forth 
in the CSA and its implementing regulations and the civil malpractice 
standard calls for an alternative criminal basis for prosecution.  The current 
standard appears to require a knowing violation, i.e., knowledge by the 
physician that he is prescribing outside the bounds of professional practice 
and not for a “legitimate medical purpose.”504  Yet, actual knowledge is not 
required in practice; rather, courts permit a willful blindness standard that, in 
effect, allows a “jury to convict based on an ex post facto ‘he should have 
been more careful’ theory or to convict on mere negligence (‘the defendant 
should have known his conduct was illegal’).”505  Whether the willful 
blindness instruction is based on a subjective or objective test can also skew 
the results, with an objective test pushing jurors towards a negligence 
standard.506  An objective willful blindness test coupled with an objective 
good faith defense further narrows the gap between a mens rea requirement 
based on knowledge versus one based on negligence.507 
When there is no indication of intent to do harm or proof of knowledge 
of wrongdoing, the criminal justice system also allows for prosecution when 
one acts “recklessly” or “negligently.”508  According to the Model Penal 
Code, 
[a] person acts recklessly . . . when he consciously disregards a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that . . . exists or will result from his conduct.  The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and 
purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its 
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.509 
The definition of criminal negligence is similar.  However, rather than 
“consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk,” the 
individual fails to perceive the risk when he should have been aware of it.510  
The risk which the actor either consciously disregards or fails to perceive 
must be both “substantial and unjustifiable.”511  Commentary to the Code 
 
 504. See 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2007). 
 505. O’SULLIVAN, supra note 340, at 101 (quoting United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836 
(4th Cir. 1994)). 
 506. See id. at 102. 
 507. See id. at 101-02. 
 508. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). 
 509. Id. § 2.02(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
 510. Id. § 2.02(2)(c-d). 
 511. Id. § 2.02(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
306 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:231 
states that “[e]ven substantial risks . . . may be created without recklessness 
when the actor is seeking to serve a proper purpose, as when a surgeon 
performs an operation that he knows is very likely to be fatal but reasonably 
thinks to be necessary because the patient has no other, safer chance.”512 
In cases of opioid prescribing, it would seem that the inquiry regarding 
recklessness or criminal negligence would focus on the risk of prescribing, 
including not only potential overdose and addiction, but also diversion.  
However, with the prescribing of any narcotic, there is a risk that the drug 
may be abused or diverted.  Yet, the physician must weigh that risk against 
the real need of the patient for pain relief.  Because a physician attempting 
to treat a patient for pain will virtually always have a justification for such 
risk, these lower standards are inherently unworkable.  As a result, I argue 
for a higher criminal standard that would help to clearly separate negligent 
or reckless behavior, which can be more appropriately dealt with in the civil 
justice system, from criminal behavior.  Such a standard would require that 
the physician had knowingly or intentionally513 prescribed a controlled 
substance for a non medical purpose or a purpose not authorized by law 
and that the physician received a tangible benefit (in excess of ordinary fees) 
for his prescribing.514  In order to prevent the knowing standard from 
crossing into a reckless or negligence test, a willful blindness instruction 
would not be permitted. 
In the cases that have gone to court, prosecutors have generally not 
provided evidence of financial gain or other benefit on the part of the 
physician, other than office fees, nor evidence of intent to divert.  Frequently, 
however, evidence is brought forth that “patients” lied to receive their drugs.  
The proposed higher standard would change the nature of the evidence and 
expert testimony required for successful prosecution from one where 
physicians are called upon to testify to the defendant’s lack of conformance 
with current standards of practice to one where evidence of financial gain or 
other benefit is put forward to establish intent or knowledge. 
This higher standard for criminal prosecution also seems appropriate in 
this context when considering the goals of the criminal justice system: 
specific and general deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution.515  The 
current standard, i.e., prosecuting pain physicians for prescribing large 
doses of opioids that seem inconsistent with legitimate medical practice, 
arguably has had an excessive deterrent effect that greatly reduces the 
 
 512. MODEL PENAL CODE & Commentaries § 2.02 cmt. 3 (1985). 
 513. The Model Penal Code defines four kinds of culpability that may serve to establish 
criminal conduct: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 
2.02(2) (1962). 
 514. Hoffmann, supra note 392. 
 515. Id. 
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number of physicians willing to treat chronic pain patients.516  Moreover, 
incapacitation—through incarceration—is unnecessary to keep suspect 
physicians from doing harm, as the Attorney General can revoke their DEA 
registration and the state medical board can revoke or suspend their license 
to practice.517 
In determining whether to revoke registration from a practitioner, the 
Attorney General must determine whether such registration is “inconsistent 
with the public interest.”518  In determining the public interest, the Attorney 
General considers, among other factors, whether the applicant has 
maintained “effective controls against diversion of . . . controlled 
substances.”519 
Finally, retribution does not seem appropriate when there is some 
evidence of prescribing for a legally authorized purpose and when there are 
other means, besides criminal prosecution, to deal with physicians who are 
dangerous or incompetent in their prescribing.520  Along with registration or 
licensure revocation, “physicians who prescribe in a manner that is below a 
professional ‘standard of care,’ and that harms a patient or third party to 
whom the physician owes a duty, should be liable for civil negligence.”521  
Such interventions are arguably better suited to prescribing for chronic pain 
patients, where physicians are required to make “tough judgment calls.”522 
B. A Greater Role for State Medical Boards 
While a higher standard for criminal liability will benefit physicians 
treating chronic pain patients (and their patients), such a higher standard 
should be accompanied by more aggressive action on the part of state 
medical boards to weed out physicians who are engaging in prescribing 
practices that are unsafe, inappropriate, or inconsistent with prevailing 
standards of care. 
State medical boards are certainly better equipped to determine whether 
the volume and dosages of opioids prescribed for a patient are consistent 
with acceptable medical practice than are federal and state prosecutors.  
Moreover, state medical boards have taken action in numerous cases where 
 
 516. Id. 
 517. Id.; see also Diane E. Hoffmann, Can State Medical Boards Adequately Respond to 
Reports that Physicians Are Inappropriately Prescribing Opioids?, 81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 
& THERAPEUTICS 799, 800 (2007) (discussing the option of having state medical boards handle 
these cases instead of prosecutors). 
 518. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) (2000). 
 519. Id. § 823(b)(1). 
 520. Hoffmann, supra note 392. 
 521. Id. 
 522. Id. 
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physicians have improperly prescribed opioids.523  Although boards were 
criticized for overaggressive actions against physicians for prescribing 
opioids in the late 1980s and early 1990s,524 more recent studies indicate 
that state boards, consistent with guidelines published by the Federation of 
State Medical Boards,525 have tempered their actions against physicians for 
prescribing high dosages of opioids and “have made significant progress in 
adjusting their requirements for disciplinary actions to better reflect emerging 
standards of care for pain treatment.”526 
While state medical boards are more likely to have the institutional 
competency to assess inappropriate prescribing, they also have 
shortcomings that may limit their effectiveness as a primary enforcer with 
regard to disciplinary action or other sanctions against physicians for 
inappropriate prescribing.  As currently constituted, state boards are often 
underfunded and understaffed and, as a result, not sufficiently aggressive in 
pursuing physician wrongdoing.  Moreover, resource constraints can result 
in delays in investigation, charging, and license revocation.527  While state 
medical boards, “with evidence that a physician’s medical practice presents 
a threat to public health and safety . . . have the ability to issue a summary 
suspension under which a physician’s license can be suspended 
immediately, this option is seldom used.”528 
If we were to rely on state medical boards to take a more active role in 
disciplining physicians in light of a higher criminal standard for arrest and 
prosecution of physicians for opioid presribing, additional resources would 
need to be allocated to this function and structural mechanisms put in place 
to allow boards to “fast track” these cases.529  A separate review committee, 
including experts in pain management, would help ensure that more 
accurate decisions are made and that, when appropriate, summary 
 
 523. See Hoffmann, supra note 517, at 799. 
 524. See, e.g., Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So. 2d 1380, 1385 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1996), in which the Florida Court of Appeals referred to the Florida Medical 
Board’s “policing [of] pain prescription practice[s]” as a “draconian policy.” 
 525. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS. OF THE U.S., supra note 281; see also Hoffmann, supra 
note 517, at 800 (“These guidelines, adopted by many states, make clear that fostering 
effective pain relief is a goal of the regulatory process, [and] that physician prescribing will not 
be judged by volume or duration of prescribing alone but instead by patient outcomes . . . .”). 
 526. Hoffmann, supra note 517, at 800; see also id. (concluding, based on a 2002 survey 
of state medical boards, “that boards seem to be moving away from volume or quantity as a 
primary basis for investigating a physician for overprescribing opioids and are looking more to 
compliance with established guidelines for appropriate prescribing as the basis for 
investigation and discipline”). 
 527. Id. 
 528. Id. at 800-01 (footnote omitted). 
 529. Id. at 801. 
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suspension and disciplinary action would accompany unsafe or incompetent 
prescribing practices. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
Recent arrests and prosecutions of physicians for prescribing opioids 
used to treat pain under section 841(a) of the Controlled Substances Act 
have had a chilling effect on physicians’ willingness to treat pain.  The fear 
on the part of physicians is, in large part, based on the uncertainty 
surrounding the criminal standard and the inability of the DEA and law 
enforcement agents to clearly articulate practices that are outside the 
bounds of professional practice.  The current standard, i.e., prescribing 
outside the bounds of professional practice or for other than a legitimate 
medical purpose, is vague and does not adequately draw the line between 
what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable conduct.  Moreover, the 
difference between the CSA’s criminal standard and a civil malpractice 
standard is not intuitively obvious and has confused jurors. 
The law creates a further barrier to physician willingness to treat chronic 
pain patients by virtue of the fact that failure to treat and undertreating pain 
can result in malpractice liability and disciplinary action by state medical 
boards.  These factors collude, resulting in significant undertreatment of 
patients with chronic pain. 
Thus, the current standard inappropriately calibrates the balance 
between the dual goals of treating pain and reducing drug abuse and 
diversion and needs to be recalibrated.  This recalibration calls for a change 
in the criminal standard to one that requires a showing of purposeful or 
knowing action on the part of a physician.  While some may argue that this 
standard tips the scales too far in the other direction, such an overcorrection 
is arguably warranted.  The result may mean that more individuals will be 
able to obtain opioids for their own use or for sale to others, but it will also 
mean that more individuals will be rescued from the agony of their 
untreated pain. 
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